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Abstract
Title:
Disparity and Applicant Faking Behaviors: how comparison with the ideal
applicant affects faking?
Author:
Yadi Yang, M.S.
Dissertation Advisor:
Gary Burns, Ph.D.
Applicant faking behavior (AFB) on personality measures remains
a major concern in selection context. This study introduces a new
construct of “disparity” which captures the difference between
individuals’ self-evaluation personality score and the perceived ideal
applicants’ personality score. Based on the Perceptual Control Theory
(PTC), applicant will generate intention to fake in order to close the
perceptional gap between an ideal applicant and themselves to increase
their chances of getting hired.
The study distinguishes intention to fake and actual faking
behaviors as two separate constructs. Specifically, the study empirically
examined the effect of disparity on applicant faking behaviors through
intention to fake as mediator. The results suggested perceived disparity
positively predicted applicant faking behaviors. In addition, job
desirability significantly moderated the relationship between disparity and
intention to fake. Furthermore, when job capability was at low level (-
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SD below the mean), job desirability as the first stage moderator
significantly moderated the relationship between disparity of extraversion
and regression adjusted difference score of extraversions through intention
to fake.
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1. Introduction
1.1.

Importance of Personality Assessment
Personality assessment was first widely utilized for military

recruitment during World War I (Handler, 2001). It was then
applied to organizations and served two main functions: helping
organizations achieve better hiring decisions and helping
employees self-evaluate themselves for individual development
(Zickar & Kostek, 2013). The movement of shifting from
traditional job analysis, that concentrated only on the job itself, to
personality-oriented work analysis (POWA), that examined not
only the job but also the context and the system that the job is
embedded in, makes personality assessment especially valuable to
organizations (Morgeson & Dierdorff, 2011). A growing body of
research showed evidence of criterion validity of personality
measures in predicting performance outcomes (Hurtz & Donovan,
2000; Motowidlo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997; Jiang, Wang, & Zhou,
2009).
Further supporting the use of personality tests, research
suggests that combining these non-cognitive personality tests with
cognitive tests together may better predict job performance than
using cognitive tests alone (Hough & Oswald, 2008; Schmidt &
Hunter, 1998). Moreover, using both personality measures and
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cognitive tests during the selection process may reduce the adverse
impact in comparison to the use of cognitive tests alone since
cognitive tests often engender more significant mean differences
among different ethnic groups (Ryan, Ployhart, & Friedel, 1998).
Personality measures also demonstrate validity in predicting job
applicants' behaviors, attitudes, and other critical organizational
outcomes (Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007). For
example, Campbell (2013) suggested that personality traits, as
measured using the Big Five framework, serve as significant
predictors for employee job satisfaction. Due to this predictive
ability, an increasing number of organizations consider
implementing personality assessments into their selection process
of candidates for different vacancies (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006).
Heller (2005) suggested that approximately 30% of US-based
companies incorporated personality measures in their selection
batteries. Furthermore, more than 40% of Fortune 100 companies
utilized personality tests to select ideal job applicants for different
positions (Erickson, 2004).

1.2.

Threat of faking
The benefits of personality assessments rely heavily on

several factors, including the psychometric characteristics of the
personality instruments implemented, the traits and criteria being
assessed, and the selection context (Prewett, Tett, & Christian,
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2013). Unlike cognitive ability tests, which have an objectively
correct answer, personality tests provide job applicants an
opportunity to manipulate their responses, and they may choose to
respond in a way that no longer reflects their true scores. Instead,
applicants select an answer that they believe increases the chances
of them being hired or interviewed. This process of distorting
one’s responses is referred to as faking.
Approximately 30% of applicants fake their responses to
personality items on average (Griffith & Converse, 2012).
Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, and Smith (2006)
conducted a study comparing personality scores between
applicants and incumbents and found that there was a considerable
difference between the two groups, with differences ranging
from .11 standard deviations for extraversion to .45 standard
deviations for conscientiousness. Researchers are concerned that
applicant faking will have a significant negative impact on hiring
decisions (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnson, & Rothstein, 1994;
Birkeland et al., 2006; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998).
According to Christiansen et al.’s (1994) findings, faking would
change the selection decisions for up to 16% of those selected by
personality assessments. This change is because applicants who
fake typically have more desirable scores on personality
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assessments and the original (honest) rank order is disturbed,
displacing 16% of applicants.

1.3.

Problems of current faking literature
Given the fact that applicant faking behaviors do occur and

have detrimental impacts, what advice should be provided to
organizations considering implementing personality assessments?
Researchers have attempted to provide practical recommendations
to organizations dealing with applicant faking behaviors; however,
these efforts to intervene and discourage applicant faking behavior
have not produced conclusive results. In general, there are two
major preventative approaches utilized by researchers: test level
prevention and personal level prevention. In terms of test level
prevention (or item level prevention), Hayes (2013) introduced
alternative forms, including forced-choice formats and subtle
items, to prevent applicant faking behaviors. With forced-choice
formats, instead of using a continuous Likert scale, participants are
instructed to choose one option from several that is "most like you"
or "least liked you." Since the different statements provided are
equally desirable or undesirable, it is difficult for applicants to
select the most favorable items. For instance, individuals may be
asked to choose the statement that is "most like you" from the two
listed statements "Sometimes I get angry at small things" and "I do
not trust other individuals at first" (Converse, Oswald, Imus,
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Hedricks, Roy, & Butera, 2006, p. 265). In this case, there are
restrictions in both statements, "at small things" and "at first",
which render both items equally undesirable, causing applicants to
struggle to identify the most favorable answer. In terms of subtle
items, they exhibit low transparency, which renders it difficult for
individuals to guess the correct answer. One sample subtle item
with no apparent meaning to participant in terms of the
psychological construct is "I used to pull the legs off insects"
(Dannenbaum & Lanyon, 1993, p. 504). When viewing items in
isolation, it is hard to link them with its assessment purpose, which
makes the selection of a correct response more complicated.
At the person level, the most frequently implemented
prevention strategies for applicant faking behaviors are warnings.
There are several types of warnings with the most common
consisting of detection warnings, consequence warnings, or a
combination warning featuring both detection and consequence
elements (Pace & Borman, 2006). In terms of detection warning, it
merely notifies applicants that if they fake, the employer will
know. However, in terms of a consequence warning, it typically
notifies applicants that there will be repercussions if they fake.
Other types of warnings usually convince applicants to respond as
honestly as possible through the use of a friendly tone and an

5

approach emplacing the educational and moral perspectives (Pace
& Borman, 2006).
Although the prevention strategies mentioned earlier may
discourage some from faking, all are controversial in terms of their
effectiveness and side effects (Griffith & Robie, 2013). One
criticism with subtle items is that they have low face validity and
low reliability in internal consistency terms (Hayes, 2013). In
terms of forced-choice questions, researchers questioned the scale's
interdependence as well as the tendency for an individual to choose
an option by making comparisons. Dilchert and Ones (2012) found
that when answering forced-choice personality items, participants
tend to choose the option that is more descriptive regardless of
their genuine level of the associated trait. Hence, the extent to
which forced-choice questions capture participants' genuine
personality characteristics remains unknown. Lastly, in terms of
warning, it provides both positive and negative effects in the
selection process. Despite that some participants considering
faking may choose not to fake when hearing the instructions of
warnings (detection, punishment, or both), a study found that some
applicants may continue to fake no matter what given the job has
extended values for them according to Expectancy theory (Pace &
Borman, 2006). Vasilopoulos, Cucina, and McElreath (2005)
found the use of detection warning result in test takers developing
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more complex faking strategies to avoid being detected when
presented themselves favorably.
Furthermore, warning instructions may influence
applicants' perceptions of the selection procedure, including
fairness perceptions. Seiler and Kuncel (2005) believed that
fairness perception negatively affects people's intention to fake.
For instance, when applicants believe that everyone else in the
selection setting is going to fake, they may perceive themselves to
be in a disadvantaged situation if they do not fake as well.
Given that a rather large body of research has explored faking
interventions, why have researchers and practitioners not been
more successful? The most significant weakness in existing
approaches may lie in their development, which has been void of
theoretical support. Most approaches for reducing or eliminating
faking were developed using practical considerations with little to
no consideration of what constitutes faking behavior. Without
sound theory or testable frameworks, faking interventions emerged
as the product of educated guesses and trial and error learning. It
may be necessary to develop a stronger theory and models in order
to guide the research questions.

1.4.

Purpose of the current study
The current study introduces a concept called “disparity,"

which captures the difference between a test taker’s personality
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profile and their perception of an ideal applicant’s profile. Based
on Vroom's expectancy theory (1964), applicants are motivated to
fake if they perceive faking as a necessary means for getting the
job. By consciously or unconsciously comparing themselves with
an ideal applicant’s profile, I hypothesize applicants will generate
an intention to fake when there is disparity between their
personality profile and an ideal applicant’s profile. This means that
if they perceive themselves as no better than the ideal applicant
when applying for a job, they will adjust their personality score to
match the ideal applicants through faking. However, if applicants
believe that their profile matches an ideal applicant, there is no
disparity between themselves and an ideal job applicant.
Applicants could easily get hired using their true score instead of
faking to get closer to an ideal applicant profile. This will result in
no intention to fake since people may only fake when they need to
(Ellingson, 2011). The current study serves as an initial test to
examine whether and how disparity will affect people’s intention
to fake. Also, I will explore potential moderators and mediators
between disparity and faking.
Since applicant faking behavior functions in a sophisticated
manner, it is necessary to examine applicant faking behaviors
thoroughly and incorporate them into a theoretical model. The
following sections will first present the relevant literature
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supporting the study design. Second, I will propose a set of
hypotheses and the method for testing them. Then, I will discuss
the results and discussion. In the literature review, I will review the
relevant literature in an exploration of four main questions: 1)
What is applicant faking; 2) When do applicants fake; 3) Does
faking matters, and 4) How faking is detected? Following those
sessions, I will examine selected frameworks of applicant faking
behavior and discuss how the proposed study may contribute to
previous faking frameworks. In the Method section, I will discuss
participant recruiting methods, research design, and measures used.
Following that, I will discuss the statistical analysis for facilitating
the finding.
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2.

Literature Review
2.1.

What is faking?
Applicant faking behaviors have been examined under

many different names such as response distortion, social
desirability, self-deception, overclaiming, and impression
management (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Each of the names typically
implies a different operational definition and encourages slightly
different research questions. However, Bok (1979) suggested that
intention is the common theme manifest through these different
terms. Organizations implement personality assessment to select
the job applicants that possess the personality traits they believed
to lead to better job performance. However, job applicants take a
personality assessment with a different purpose compared with
organizations. Some job applicants see taking personality
assessment as a chance to increase their probability of getting
hired. With this intention, some of them decide to fake good to get
closer to what organizations are looking for (Griffith, Malm,
English, Yoshita, & Gujar, 2006).
Other than matching organizations' expectations in order to
get hired, previous research suggested that most common driver
behind applicant faking behaviors was social desirability, which is
defined as "the tendency to give overly positive self-descriptions"
(Paulhus, 2002, p. 50). Paulhus (1986) further examined social
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desirability as having two sub-factors: self-deception and
impression management. Self-deception is defined as "any
positively biased response that respondents believe to be true" (p.
146), while impression management is defined as a "conscious
attempt to create a favorable impression in some audience" (p.
146). Social desirability happens beyond organizational settings
and can manifest across different aspects of thought and behavior.
Due to positive self-evaluation bias, individuals are ordinarily less
accurate in evaluating their performance compared with evaluating
the performance of others (John & Robins, 1994). One real-life
example impression management is that people often overstate
their height and understate their weight in public (Burke &
Carman, 2017). Furthermore, people typically avoid posting
unflattering occurrences on social media in order to manage their
impressions (Ward, 2017). While social desirability is clearly
connected to faking, the social desirability view of faking has
largely been replaced by more sophisticated frameworks (Griffith
& Peterson, 2008).
Johnson and Hogan (2006) proposed a socio-analytic view
of applicant faking behaviors in contrast with the social desirability
view. They suggested that it is unreasonable to assume applicants
would answer personality items with 100% objectivity. Instead, all
test takers have agendas, but only some of them present themselves
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in a socially desirable manner. Scott (1963) suggested that even for
some people who tend to engage in social desirability, they vary in
their opinions in terms of what is socially desirable. Thus, their
behaviors followed after their intention to appear in a socially
desirable way differ within the group. The critical difference
between the common agenda and socially desirable agenda is the
consistency of self-presentation. A common agenda that is
consistent regardless of situations is what organizations want to
capture as personality, and socially desirable agenda that only
occurs in certain situations is what organizations want to avoid as
faking.
Heggestad and Andrew (2012) viewed applicant faking
behaviors as a measurement issue and defined it as “a behavior that
affects a persons' responses to particular personality items within a
particular testing setting (p. 93). For example, applicant faking
behaviors can be operationalized by comparing applicants'
personality scores in unmotivated settings (a proxy for the true
score) with those collected in a motivated applicant setting (which
are frequently distorted). Griffith et al. (2006) examined applicant
faking as the difference between participants' true scores and
applicant scores. The researchers suggested that the construction of
faked behavioral responses to personality assessments are captured
through the examination of individual difference, situational
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variance, and cognitive biases. Burns and Christiansen (2011)
operationalized applicant faking behavior as the distorted
responses to personality assessments that lead to score shifts.
In conclusion, despite that the perspectives for
understanding applicant faking behaviors differ, one consistent
theme across viewpoints is that applicant faking behaviors occur
when applicants seek to generate a self-description more conducive
to realizing a given goal, which is affected by both situational
factors and individual characteristics.

2.2.

When do applicants fake?
Deception behaviors might be an expected behavior in

competitive situations such as job applications (Griffith &
McDaniel, 2006). Griffith et al. (2007) compared faking in an
applicant and nonmotivated conditions and found considerable
differences between the two groups (d = .61) using a withinsubjects design. Griffith and Converse (2012) synthesized previous
research and suggested that an average of 30% of participants fake
their responses in selection. However, the prevalence of applicant
faking behavior vary. Why would some applicants fake and the
others not?
Though research has demonstrated that applicants can fake,
it is still unclear when applicants will fake. In order to understand
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in which circumstances applicants will distort their responses,
researchers have examined many different factors. Leary and
Kowalski (1990) suggested that faking is a choice behavior that
requires a motivating force. Job applicants distort their responses
due to the competing pressure of getting a job. According to
Vroom's (1964) expectancy theory (VIE), people would only fake
a personality assessment when they evaluate the situation as being
beneficial to fake. Specifically, applicants fake when 1) they can
fake successfully (Expectancy); 2) faking is necessary to increase
their personality scores (Instrumentality); 3) the target job is
attractive (Valence).
To elaborate, the factors affecting expectancy judgment
(whether they can fake successfully or not) consist of personality
traits, cognitive ability, job knowledge, and experience (Ellingson,
2012). When the combined effects of these relevant factors lead
individuals to believe they can fake a personality assessment
successfully, applicants may be more motivated to engage in
faking behavior. Furthermore, item transparency and prevention
techniques such as warnings may affect people's evaluation of
whether they can fake successfully (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).
In terms of instrumentality, the appraisal of whether faking
enables applicants to get the job is affected by applicants' true
score (McFarland & Ryan, 2000), social and situational norms
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(Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999), as well as personal ethics (Boyce,
2005). When an applicant's true score and moral standards are
relatively low and faking is considered reasonable and necessary to
get the job, applicants have a higher motivation to fake. Valence,
or job attractiveness, is determined by three factors: job
desirability, marketability, and job search self-efficacy (Ellingson,
2012). Job desirability can be defined as the level of attractiveness
and value for a specific job compared with other alternative jobs.
Applicant marketability is affected by their skills, knowledge, and
experience, and reflects how applicants consider themselves as
valuable to potential employers. For instance, applicants with
fewer skills, less knowledge, and less experience tend to believe
they have fewer opportunities to get other jobs. Therefore, it is
more likely for them to generate higher motivation to fake because
they cannot afford to lose their current job opportunities. Job
search self-efficacy can be defined as "an individual's selfevaluation of their capacity to perform the job search behaviors
necessary to obtain employment" (Ellingson, 2012, p. 27). In other
words, this demonstrates that applicants who believe they can
easily find other jobs have higher standards in evaluating job
valence.
Tett, Anderson, Ho, Yang, Huang, and Hanvongse (2006)
suggested that applicant faking behaviors is an interactional effect
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of both individual difference factors and the embedded situational
factors. Several individual differences have been highlighted as
potentially playing a role in the faking process. Book, Holden,
Starzyk, Wasylkiw, and Edwards (2006) examined the individual
difference factors of faking and suggested that individuals with
higher psychopathic traits tend to be more skilled in faking
compared with others. Levashina, Morgeson, and Campion (2009)
also suggested that people with higher cognitive ability tend to
engage in applicant faking behaviors less likely, but if they did
engage in faking, they tended to be more successful in faking than
people with a low cognitive ability. McFarland and Ryan (2000)
found that people with higher integrity scores were less likely to
engage in faking behaviors. This is because faking is a choice
behavior that is affected by an individual's moral and ethical values
(Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 1996).
Besides individual factors, situational factors also play an
essential role in affecting people's decision to fake. Tett and
Gutterman (2000) proposed three underlying assumptions
regarding situational factors. Firstly, the way the situation is
perceived mediates the impact of situational factors on behavior.
Secondly, people and the environment influence each other.
Thirdly, it is necessary to place people in trait relevant situations
such as applicant situations in order for them to accurately express
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their personality traits. Mueller Hanson, Heggestad, and Thornton
(2006) found that perceptions of situations such as beliefs of the
importance of faking relate to intention to fake. Also, job
familiarity and knowledge of the constructs being measured
influenced people’s ability to fake (Raymark & Tafero, 2009).
In terms of other explanations of why not all applicants
fake, Sackett (2011) proposed that whether applicants engage in
faking behaviors is affected by their temporal orientations. For
instance, applicants with short-term orientation are more likely to
fake to achieve immediate rewards (getting the job) than applicants
with long-term orientations (partnership with employers). Along
this line, the research found that applicants who perceive the
employment process as a monetary exchange instead of a
relationship are more likely to fake.

2.3.

Does faking matter?
Though evidence showed that a substantial portion of

applicants do engage in faking behaviors when answering
personality items, why do we care? A meta-analysis on the effects
of instructed faking suggested that across the Big Five personality
dimensions, the effects of mean scale scores are an approximately
half standard deviation for instructions to fake good (Viswesvaran
& Ones, 1999). In terms of naturally occurring faking, Krammer,
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Sommer, and Arendasy (2017) demonstrated that honest responses
for personality scales have a lower raw mean than applicant
responses (d = .36) and a lower raw mean compared with
instructed faking good response (d = .36).
Besides influencing the mean scores, faking also affects the
correlational structure and validity of personality instruments. For
instructed faking research, Holden and Book (2012) found that
scales tend to correlate with each other more under instruction to
fake regardless of faking good or bad. Similarly, for naturally
occurring faking, Schmit and Ryan (1993) demonstrated that the
factor structure of NEO-FFI is different between job applicant
sample and student sample. Brown and Barrett (1999) found that
the factor structure for the 16PF was also different between a job
applicant sample and a non-applicant sample.
In terms of the effects of faking on validity, Douglas,
McDaniel, and Snell (1996) suggested that after experimentally
inducing faking, the criterion validity of personality scales
decreased. For naturally occurring faking, the impacts of faking on
the validity of personality scales are mixed. Some research
suggested that faking has little to no impact on the validity of
personality scales (Piedmont, McCrae, Riemann, & Angleitner,
2000; Barrick & Mount, 1996; Zickar, 2000; Zickar, Rosse, &
Levin, 1996) while others suggested faking can account for the
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variability of prediction (Putka & McCloy, 2004; Holden, 2008;
Meuller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Thornton, 2003). These
discrepancies in findings could be explained by the different
criteria used, sample difference, analytical methods, assessment
contexts (i.e., student, job applicant, military), or base rate of
faking (Holden & Book, 2012).
Other than affecting the psychometric properties of
personality assessments, faking is problematic in the working
world when using personality assessments in selection (Hoffman,
2000). Faking affects the selection decisions of the organizations
since distortion of personality scores will reduce the accuracy of
evaluations made by the organizations (Mueller-Hanson et al.,
2003). Ellingson, Sackett, and Hough (1999) conducted a study to
compare the rank orders between honest responding group and
instructed faking group; when working with a scenario with a
selection ratio of 30%, more than 50% of those individuals who
would NOT be selected with their honest situation scores would be
selected in instructed faking condition scores. Also, McFarland
(2003) found that faking would affect the fairness perceptions of
test-takers. Since employment is a two-way selection process
where not only employers select future employees, employees also
make conscious decisions of whether to accept the job or not.
Perception of unfairness could lead to employees self-selecting
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themselves out of the hiring process (Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas,
2004).

2.4.

How faking is detected?
The commonly used methods of faking detection can be

grouped into two levels: the scale level and individual level. At the
scale level, commonly used validity scales for detecting faking
behaviors are built upon assessing socially desirable responses
using measurement instruments such as the Balanced Inventory of
Desirable Responding (BIDR; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran,
2006). Validity scales are assumed to be able to detect those who
deliberately respond to personality assessments in a socially
desirable manner. Unfortunately, as discussed in the previous
section, applicant faking behavior is a complicated process instead
of a single phenomenon. Hence, measurement instruments
designed to detect applicant faking behaviors using a social
desirability framework may fail to identify other types of applicant
faking behaviors (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2006). For
instance, the validity scales of the California Personality Inventory
(CPI) scale are more successful in capturing faking behaviors
when applicants elevate their scores in all personality attributes,
but not when they do so only for a specific personality attribute
(Dicken, 1960; Sandal & Enresen, 2002; Montross, Neas, Smith, &
Henley, 1988). Besides using validity scales, researchers also
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employ overclaiming questionnaires to detect applicant faking
behaviors (Paulhus & Bruce, 1990; Bing, Kluemper, Davison,
Taylor, & Novicevic, 2011; Pesta & Poznanski, 2009).
Overclaiming scales ask applicants to report their knowledge or
experience on certain nonexistent items. When people claim to
have experience with fictitious items, they are considered engaging
in overclaiming. Nonetheless, this only captures a specific form of
applicant faking behaviors (overclaiming).
At the individual level, applicant faking behaviors can be
captured using statistical methods based on the notion that "faking
causes shifts in the means and construct relationships" (Burns &
Christiansen, 2011, p. 358). There are different approaches to
assessing faking in terms of score differences. The first method
assesses linear shifts by calculating raw score differences for
personality tests between the baseline and applicant conditions
(motivated condition) (McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Another
approach involves monitoring nonlinear response pattern shifts for
personal items (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007). It is important to
understand that the score difference may not be faking but be the
result of measurement error, differences in applicants' emotional
states, or other natural factors in a within-subjects design. Hence,
Griffith et al. (2007) proposed a research method that makes use of
psychometric confidence intervals as a framework. Participants
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scoring outside the confidence interval range, constructed around
the honest score, are considered to be engaging in faking
behaviors.

2.5.

Current models of faking
Applicant faking behavior is not a simple construct but

rather a complicated reasoning process. One reason for the slow
progress of faking research is that no single framework fully
captures all the possible reasoning processes that contribute to
applicant faking behavior. The intention to fake, opportunity to
fake, and actual applicant faking behaviors all differ significantly
from each other (Tett et al., 2006), and have been addressed from
several rationale perspectives. The problems with applicant faking
behaviors will remain unresolved without acquiring a full
understanding regarding how these factors interact and engender
actual faking behaviors. Despite the need for developed models to
gain a better knowledge of applicant faking behaviors, relatively
few researches have made contributions to faking theories and
frameworks. Among those, some of the theories built prominent
foundations to the progress of faking literature, including Snell,
Sydell, and Lueke (1999) and McFarland and Ryan (2000). I will
also discuss a recent model developed by Goffin and Boyd (2009).
All of the three models were developed to explain the
antecedents of applicant faking behavior. Snell et al. (1999)
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proposed that applicant faking behavior is influenced by the
interactional effect of both individual difference factors and
contextual factors. According to their framework of faking,
successful faking is dependent on two factors: the ability to fake
and the willingness to fake. For each of these two factors, they
proposed several individual difference factors and contextual
factors associated with it. For example, for individual difference
factors associated with the ability to fake, they suggest that
cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, and experiential factors
such as the knowledge of what is required for the job position all
contribute to people's ability to fake. In terms of willingness to
fake, they proposed it is affected by dispositional factors such as
integrity and stage of moral development and contextual factors,
including warning and desirability of test outcomes.
McFarland and Ryan (2000) proposed a process model of
faking based on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,1991).
According to their model, intention to fake is affected by several
factors, including beliefs toward faking and situational influences.
In terms of factors affecting people's beliefs of faking, they
proposed that it is affected by people's values, morals, religions,
and personality traits. Situational influences affecting people's
intention to fake include an individual's desire for the job and
whether there is a warning of a lie scale of warning of verification.
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However, intention to fake does not necessarily lead to faking
behaviors. This relationship is moderated by both their ability to
fake and opportunity to fake. For example, if an individual has
little knowledge of the construct being measured (affecting the
ability to fake) or very high true score (affecting the opportunity to
fake), they are less likely to engage in faking behaviors.
Goffin and Boyd (2009) developed a general faking model based
on Snell et al. (1999) and McFarland et al. (2000) framework of
faking. They examined the antecedents of faking motivation and
understood faking ability from both individual differences and
evaluative factors. Individual differences factors of faking
motivation consider personality traits and moral core, while
antecedents of motivation consider the "perception that faking will
have negative consequences" and "perceived need to fake in item
response" (p. 153). Regarding the antecedents of perceived faking
ability, individual difference factors consider personality traits and
skills as well as abilities and experience. However, the evaluative
antecedents of perceived faking ability consist of perceived
opportunity, perceived job knowledge, and requisite personality
traits. According to this model, those with low self-control and a
high acceptance of deception are understood to have the need to
fake, with the perceived success of faking enduring a higher
motivation to fake.
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A consistent theme that links these models is that they all
recognize the crucial roles of contextual factors and individual
difference factors in affecting applicants' intention to fake. Also,
they agree that people's faking behavior is affected by both
abilities to fake and opportunity to fake. Although all three models
provide some valuable insights in understanding applicant faking
behavior, it has some conceptual and empirical limitations. Though
they proposed many factors influencing intention to fake, there is a
lack of theory concerning which factors are the determining factors
or which factors carry more weight in affecting faking. Besides,
the models remain largely untested, and the proposed relationships
need to be further tested through empirical efforts.

2.6.

Concept of Disparity

2.6.1. Why disparity
Developed from a process perspective, Levashina and
Campion's (2006) proposed a model of faking likelihood suggested
that three predictors account for faking exist consisting of the
capacity to fake, willingness to fake, and opportunity to fake. So
that faking can occur, all three predictors must be present
simultaneously. This model captures both the “can do” and “will
do” aspects of faking. Marcus (2009) proposed a process model
according to which applicant self-presentation strategies are
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affected by situational factors (willingness to present themselves in
a good manner) and skills (analytical and behavioral). Both
models distinguished intention to fake from actual faking behavior
and view applicant faking behavior as a process of decision
making, whereas certain factors trigger applicants to generate an
intention to fake and therefore lead to actual faking behaviors. In
the current study, I will examine what the main factors that
generate an intention to fake are, and I propose that intention to
fake does not necessarily lead to actual faking behaviors. Instead,
there will be a conscious reasoning process post the intention
generation phase that determines whether people will engage in
actual faking behaviors or not.
Though many studies have examined predictors of
applicant faking behaviors, many fail to distinguish intention to
fake and actual faking behaviors. This led to a mixed result of
whether certain factors indeed influence faking or not. For
example, Pauls and Crost (2005) found notable correlations
between cognitive ability and faking, whereas Griffith et al. (2006)
found no relationship between these two. Also, McFarland and
Ryan (2000) found a negative relationship between Big Five scores
and faking, but Griffith et al. (2006) found a mixed result.
According to McFarland and Ryan (2006), the reason why there
are inconsistent results in previous studies might be the ignorance
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of how important context is. Applicant context is a strong situation
where most of the applicants engage in a certain kind of selfpresentation, so the differences in some traits are canceled out.
Self-presentation is defined as an "attempt to portray a
specific image (or impression) to others," and the ultimate goal of
self-presentation is to "monitor and control how others perceive
them" (Gammage, 2014, p. 650). Highhouse, Brooks, and Wang
(2016) suggested that those engaged in self-presentation do so, not
only to meet others' expectations, but also to create a positive
impression of themselves. Similarly, job applicants may vary their
scores of personality assessment not only to satisfy social norms
but also to impress potential employers in order to be hired by the
organization. Johnson and Hogan (2006) believed that individuals'
presentation of themselves depends on their evaluations of how
others consider them, so the self-presentation tend to reflect who
they are (true self). More precisely, Gammage (2014) suggested
that despite that, applicants try to present themselves honestly; they
may stress certain personality traits more than others in any given
situation.
For example, job applicants may choose to emphasize
certain positive personality traits and hide negative ones that they
believe are relevant to the job. However, the way individuals
choose to present themselves is affected by several factors,
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including their self-concepts and their perception of target
audience preferences (Piotrowski, 2010). To elaborate, job
applicants concerned with self-presentation may choose strategies
and desired images based on their perception of the organization's
ideal employee’s profile. Also, their perception of themselves
influences how they present themselves. If they perceive their
characteristics firmly match with the job, they may present
themselves more honestly. However, if they perceive themselves
as less qualified in comparison to the ideal employee, they are
more likely to distort their responses in order to resemble better
what they believe is the company's ideal employee. Therefore, it is
difficult to predict how applicants distort their responses without
an understanding of their self-perception and notion of an ideal
employee.
Konig, Merz, and Trauffer (2012) found that applicants
often believed organizations had certain expectations, which
created an ideal job applicant profile. They also found that
depending on how they perceive the ideal job applicant profile;
they have different preferences of whether to choose the
intermediate answers versus the extremely good answers during
selection. Ellingson (2012) suggested that: 1). People only fake
when they need to; 2). Faking, rather than being a trait, is a
behavioral choice. More specifically, for applicant faking
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behaviors to occur, applicants must be motivated (Leary &
Kowalski, 1990). When applicants perceive that there is no
disparity between themselves and the ideal job applicant, it is less
likely to generate an intention to fake as faking has no value
towards their goals.
Since all behaviors are goal-oriented, it makes sense that
applicant faking behavior is as well (Diefendorff & Chandler,
2011). The common goal for nearly all applicants is to get the job.
When they believe they are more than qualified for the potential
job position, there are no discrepancies, and, therefore, no intention
to fake. According to Perceptual Control Theory (PCT), behaviors
are not controlled but varied depending on the negative feedback
by comparing self-input and environmental events/stimulus
(Powers, 1973). Besides, people do not control their behaviors or
the environment but their perceptions. Hence, the behavior is the
control of perceptions. In the context of applicant faking behaviors,
when applicants received negative feedback by comparing
themselves against their perceived ideal applicant’s profile, the
difference determines their intentions/goals — the subsequent
behaviors of faking varied to control their perceptions of whether
they will get hired.
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2.6.2. Definition of disparity
In the current study, I apply the three elements (self-input,
environment, and comparator) of PCT theory to explain the
phenomenon of applicant faking behaviors. I believe that people
have a perception of their standing in terms of personality scores,
and they also generate a perception of how an ideal applicant
looks. Through the conscious comparison between these two
perceptions, there comes negative feedback, which I name it as
disparity. In order to change their perceptions of the chances of
getting hired, applicants change their behaviors based on the value
of disparity. That is why people vary in their faking behaviors.
The concept of disparity is popular in sociology, which
captures the lack of similarity between two or more groups
(Stillwell, Norman, Thomas, & Surridge, 2010). The concept of
disparity can be categorized into actual disparity, such as regional
disparity, or perceived disparity. The disparity that will lead to
faking can be defined as the perceived inequality between
applicants' perceived true score and their perceived ideal job
applicant scores. When applicants perceived their scores as
unequal to the ideal applicant score, disparity occurs. More
specifically, when applicants perceived their scores as higher than
the ideal applicant scores, there is a positive disparity
(Christiansen, Montgomery, & Burns, 2005). In this case, they
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perceive themselves as more than qualified. However, when
applicants perceived their scores as lower than the ideal applicant
scores, there is a negative disparity, and applicants viewed
themselves as disqualified for the position. When applicants
perceived their true score as equal to the ideal applicant score,
there is no disparity. People perceive themselves as just qualified
but depending on their evaluation of the competitiveness and job
desirability, may still engage in faking behaviors to increase their
chances of getting hired.

2.6.3. Compare disparity with similar concepts
The term of disparity may not sound familiar in faking
literature. However, quite a large number of studies have examined
its similar concept called "opportunity to fake." Opportunity to
fake refers to “the extent to which individuals are able to increase
their scores on the basis of their true scores" (McFarland & Ryan,
2000). Douglas, McDaniel, and Snell (1996) found that the
opportunity to fake may play an important role in determining the
extent to which applicants fake, and some applicants have more
opportunity to fake compared with others if they have lower true
scores. Since faking is intentional behavior that people engaged in
to reduce discrepancies between their true scores and the job
requirements, faking is less likely to occur if applicants believe
there is no opportunity to fake (Levashina & Campion, 2006).

31

For example, it is hard for individuals who are already very
extraverted to fake on a scale measuring extraversion even if they
intend to do so. Opportunity to fake is not only determined by
applicants’ true score and the maximum scores of the test but also
the context factors. Dipboye (1994) found that unstructured
interviews provide more opportunity to fake due to the lack of jobrelevant information or inaccurate conceptions of the ideal
applicant.
Though the concept of opportunity to fake provide valuable
insights into the understanding of applicant faking behaviors, it has
several problems. Based on the definition, the measurement of
opportunity requires two necessary parts: the true score and the
maximum scores of the test. In terms of the first element (true
score), it is hard to capture the real personality credentials of
individuals. Similar to Classical Test Theory, where the true score
is a hypothetical score, the true score of personality is also a
hypothetical score where existing ways of capturing it only provide
an estimated value of one's personality (Traub, 1994). Researchers
have called to apply the multi-trait multi-methods strategy to
measure personality scores, hoping to capture more consistent
scores of people’s personality traits. This might be effective in
generating consistent scores of personality traits, but does
consistency mean true score? Johnson and Hogan (2006) suggested
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that consistency of behaviors are different from personality
because “personality is not reflected in the tendency to behave the
same way across situations but the tendency to seek out (or avoid)
particular kinds of situations and the consistent ways people
present themselves in particular situations" (p. 213). Also, even for
people in the non-applicant condition that designed with no
intention to induce motivation to fake, it is hard for test-takers to
communicate with completely objective responses (Johnson &
Hogan, 2006).
The second element for measuring the opportunity to fake
is the maximum scores people can achieve. This falsely assumes
that all applicants believe that the best way to get hired is
achieving the highest possible scores (full score). Heine and
Lehman (1995a) found that certain cultures like Japan emphasize a
lot of "beauty in modesty," so job applicants often intentionally
fake bad to make themselves look more modest. Besides, people
vary in their ability to discern which personality is essential for the
jobs and what characteristics employers are looking for (Snell &
Fluckinger, 2006). Frei, Snell, McDaniel, and Griffith (1998)
found that applicants with a complete understanding of the
personality types necessary for the job could provide higher scores
more effectively when instructed to fake. Therefore, depending on
people's evaluation and understanding of the ideal applicant’s
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profile, applicants may vary their intention to fake and the
subsequent strategies of faking.

2.6.4. How to measure disparity
Since there is no way to assess the true scores of applicants
fully, all the information collected through the implementation of
personality assessment is the self-evaluation of individuals.
According to PTC theory, people do not control their behaviors
directly but control their behaviors through the change of
perceptions (Powers, 1973). The same logic works for applicant
faking behaviors; people do not engage in faking behaviors
directly but control their perceptions of disparity to achieve faking.
To elaborate, applicants come into the selection settings with a
naturally holding perception of personality standings (p).
Perceptions of the current state are then compared with the desired
state (p*), also called the reference signal (Powers, 1973). The
desired state in the selection context would be the perceived ideal
applicant’s profile (i.e., ideal employees that organizations are
looking for). Through comparison, the difference between selfevaluations (p) and perceived ideal applicant’s profile (p*) is
referred to as disparity (d). Negative disparity (when perceived
ideal applicant score is smaller than self-evaluation score) is
treated as zero disparity. For example, when an individual
perceived himself as five on extraversion and perceived the ideal
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applicant as four on extraversion, they are better than the ideal
applicant. Therefore, there is no intention to fake. The equation for
the disparity is:
If p*- p < 0, then d = p*- p; else d = 0
Responses to disparity (d) between self-evaluation (p) and
perceived ideal applicant’s profile (p*) is represented by intention
to fake (i). However, intention to fake (i) is not determined by
disparity alone. It is also affected by job desirability (j). When
applicants viewed the job positions as highly desirable, even when
there is just small disparity, applicants can generate a large
intention to fake. Also, even when there is no disparity where
applicants' self-evaluation score is equal to their perceived ideal
applicant score, they may still generate a small intention to fake.
However, when the job is less desirable to applicants, in order for
them to generate an intention to fake, the disparity value must be
substantial (Vancouver, Weinhardt, & Schmidt, 2010). Other
factors may affect the negative feedback loop from disparity to
actual faking behaviors include moral disengagement, capability of
doing the job and risk perception of faking. To elaborate, intention
to fake will be directly affected by moral disengagement such that
people who are morally disengaged (people who are able to justify
unethical behaviors) are more likely to generate intention to fake.
As explained previously, intention to fake does not necessarily lead
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to actual faking behaviors. In this study, I propose that people who
perceive themselves as having high capacity to carry out the job
responsibilities if they are hired (capacity) and viewing faking
behaviors as with low risk but high benefits are more likely to
engage in actual faking behaviors. Each of the constructs will be
explained in detail in the next section. The basic structure of this
negative feedback loop is presented in Figure 1 below.

2.7.

Intention to fake

2.7.1. What is the intention to fake?
Motivation or intention produces forces that initiate and
influence the direction (what people focus their attention on),
intensity (the amount of effort devoted to the behaviors), and
duration of behaviors (Pinder, 2014). Diefendorff and Chandler
(2011) suggested that behavior is goal-directed, and discrepancy
reduction is a basic universal process for certain behaviors to
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occur. Applicant faking behavior is also goal-oriented, and
applicants' ultimate goal is to look more like the ideal applicant’s
profile that organizations are looking for and get hired. McFarland
and Ryan (2000) suggested that the intention to fake has a direct
effect on actual faking behaviors. In their study, they clearly
distinguished the concept of faking into three elements: intention
to fake, behaviors of faking, and faking outcomes. Intention to fake
refers to the motivating forces that initiate behaviors of faking, and
behaviors of faking lead to different faking outcomes, including
changing test scores, affecting scale reliability, factor structure,
and scale validity. It is crucial to distinguish intention to fake and
actual faking behaviors since studies found that though most
participants taking the test and wanting to get the job, not all of
them will generate intention to fake and not all of those who have
intention to fake will engage in actual faking behaviors (Snell et
al., 1999; Levashina et al., 2006).

2.7.2. Factors affecting intention to fake
Job desirability
Intention to fake is not only depending on disparity but also
on other factors. Paulhus (2002) believed that the most common
intention behind applicant faking behaviors was social desirability,
which is defined as "the tendency to give overly positive selfdescriptions" (p. 50). According to its definition, social desirability

37

refers more to the general tendency of faking good instead of
creating any specific presentations or impressions (Tristan, 2009).
However, applicant faking behavior is not only a complicated
behavior but also a context-specific behavior. The social
desirability scale fails to capture the context-specific
tendencies/strategies applicants utilized while answering
personality items. It is possible that context-specific factors
affecting people's faking behaviors differently, so the effects of
faking have been canceled out. Therefore, statistically controlling
or correcting the social desirability fails to provide beneficial
effects in much research (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). This could
explain why some studies found that faking does not matter when
using the social desirability scale as a detection tool (Ones et al.,
1996). Hence, it is crucial to explore other factors influencing the
intention to fake to detect better and understand the effect of
faking.
Ones et al. (1996) suggested that there might be a response
distortion bias depending on specific job contexts. Kluger and
Colella (1993) believed that applicants may have "job-specific
bias,'' the tendency of distorting their responses and present
themselves as having the characteristics the organizations are
looking for when applying for the specific job. This job-specific
bias is also called job desirability. Job desirability can be defined
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as "the degree to which a given job is wanted or needed"
(Ellingson, 2012, p. 25). Ellingson (2012) suggested that people
only fake when they need to, and job desirability serves as a
proximal measure of the valence in a given opportunity/action. For
example, when the job is viewed as less desirable from the
perspective of applicants, there is less valence in faking since
getting the job does not count too much to them. However, when
the job is highly desirable or needed, faking might be viewed as a
highly valuable means of achieving the final goals (getting the
job).
Job desirability is different from social desirability in terms
of the tendency of presentation methods. People engaged in social
desirability tendency present themselves in a general good manner
without specific strategies, while people affected by job
desirability will engage in a more sophisticated presentation
strategy depending on the selection context. For example, people
with social desirability tendencies often fake good in nearly all
personality dimensions without considering too much about what
employers are looking for. A sample item measuring social
desirability would be “I never cover up my mistakes” (Paulhus,
1988). However, applicants affected by job desirability will
consciously evaluate the job fit, their current need for employment,
the perceived opportunities in getting other jobs, and decide the

39

appropriate manner of presentation (Ellingson, 2012). A sample
item measuring job disability would be "I'll do whatever is
necessary to get the job” (Ellingson, 2012). In the current study, I
propose that job desirability will moderate the relationship between
disparity and intention to fake. To elaborate, when applicants
perceived no disparities (d) between self-evaluation (p) and
perceived ideal applicant score (p*) (p-p*>0, d = 0), job
desirability will not have an impact on intention to fake. However,
when there are disparities (p-p*<0 or = 0), job desirability will
play a role in determining how much intention to fake people will
generate.
Risk Perceptions
In addition, I propose that risk perceptions will negatively
predict intention to fake. Applicant faking behaviors are intentional
and risky behaviors that often associated with potential punishment
if caught (Levashina & Campion, 2006). This is why previous
studies often implement warnings, especially warnings with
negative consequences such as repercussions to prevent faking
(Pace & Borman, 2006). Risk perceptions can be understood using
the risk-return framework where individuals' preferences for risky
behaviors are reflected by the tradeoff between the expected
benefits and the expected risks of engaging in this risky option
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(Weber,1997,1998). See the function below (Weber, Blais, & Betz,
2002, p. 265):
Preference(X) = a (Expected Benefit) + b (Perceived Risk) + c

According to this framework, individuals’ preference and
the decision choice followed the preference for risky options might
differ if they perceive risks and benefits in different magnitude
(Weber et al., 2002). Bontempo, Bottom, and Weber (1997) found
empirical evidence that people's perceptions of riskiness of risky
choice differ at both individual and group levels, but people have
greater agreement on expected benefits (Weber, Anderson, &
Birnbaum, 1992). At the individual level, O’Neill, Lee, Radan,
Law, Lewis, and Carswell (2013) found that more risk-tolerant
individuals may engage in higher levels of faking than do
applicants who are risk-averse. For applicants who are high risktaking, faking can be treated as a high-stakes gamble over getting
caught or getting the job (Tett & Simonet, 2011).
In addition, studies found there were significant cultural
differences in risk perceptions, and uncertainty avoidance countries
are less tolerant of risky options (de Luque & Javidan,2004). This
is because individuals from uncertainty avoidance cultures
perceived higher risks of getting caught and being punished
(Seleim & Bontis, 2009). In the context of applicant faking
behavior, the intention to fake is influenced by the perceived risks
(the probability of getting caught) based on the model of volitional
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rating behaviors (Kane, 1994) and perceived benefits based on
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Therefore, I propose that
applicants perceived faking as low risk will generate higher
intention to fake.

2.7.3. Moderators for the relationship between
intention to fake and observed faking
Moral disengagement
Individuals' moral stands also influence applicant faking
behaviors. McFarland and Ryan (2000) found that individuals
perceive faking differently in terms of their morality. For instance,
some individuals view faking as acceptable if they believe faking
can lead to favorable hiring decisions, while others believe that
faking is morally wrong, so they are less likely to consider faking
in selection. Also, a research in social psychology suggested that
people who hold higher moral standards are less likely to distort
their responses or vary their presentations to others (Leary &
Kowalski, 1990). This is because faking is considered wrong in
their personal moral rules. McFarland and Ryan (2000) proposed
that intention to fake is affected by their beliefs towards faking
(whether faking is acceptable), and one of the factors affecting
people's beliefs is their personal values and moral codes. When
individuals hold a stringent standard of personal ethics, the
intention of engaging in morally wrong behaviors will be inhibited,
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and an affective reaction (i.e., dislike faking) should constrain the
amount of effort devoted to actual faking behaviors (Ellingson &
McFarland, 2011). Even though the individual differences in moral
codes could be explained by demographic factors such as ethnicity,
sex, and age (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998), implementing these
demographic variables into the study alone provides little insight in
explaining people's moral tendency.
Therefore, I incorporate a construct of moral
disengagement to examine an essential driver towards unethical
decisions in the current study. Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004)
suggested that individual’s decisions towards unethical behavior is
heavily influenced by their cognitive processing of information.
According to social cognitive theory, individuals’ behaviors are
controlled by the self-regulatory processes that encourage
behaviors consistent with their moral standards but deter behaviors
that violate the moral standards through self-sanction. However,
when this self-regulatory system goes wrong, the link between
transgressive behaviors and self-condemnation will be disabled
(Bandura, 2002). This process of moral disengagement can be
defined as the process that “people cognitively process decisions
and behaviors with ethical import that allows those inclined to
morally disengage to behave unethically without feeling
distressed" (Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012, p. 2).
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That is, the moral disengagement mechanism allows individuals to
engage in decisions and behaviors of wrongdoing without apparent
cognitive distress. Moore et al. (2012) found that moral
disengagement emerges as a significant predictor of a wide range
of unethical behaviors in organizations across five different
samples. Therefore, I propose that moral disengagement will
moderate the relationship between intention to fake and observed
faking behaviors since faking is considered as unethical when
evaluating through a working cognitive self-regulatory process. To
elaborate, I propose that the relationship between intention to fake
and observed faking behaviors are stronger for applicants with
high moral disengagement.
The capability of doing the job
The intention to fake serves as an essential antecedent of
applicant faking behaviors, especially in a selection setting.
However, intention to fake does not necessarily result in applicant
faking behavior. Most of the job applicants likely want to get hired
and therefore have the intention to fake if they think faking is a
necessary mean to get hired. However, not all applicants actually
distort their responses in order to get hired. One potential causal
factor driving different decisions to fake is that people frequently
hold different evaluations of their capability of conducting job
responsibilities.
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Goffin and Boyd (2009) developed a decision tree model
that illustrated the step by step decision-making process to fake in
the selection context. The questions people face when making such
a decision involves moral code violations (“will faking violate my
moral code), item job-relatedness (“Will my response to this item
be seen as relevant to the job?”), self-evaluation (“Is the behavior
or tendency referred to in this item characteristic of me?”), item
helpfulness for getting hired (“would faking my response result in
me not being hired?”), and capacity to carry out the job’s desired
behaviors ( “Am I capable of demonstrating the desired behavior
or tendency on the job?”). In the decision tree model, the six
questions were presented in the above order, with the applicant's
response (Yes/No) to each question determining whether the
applicant responds honestly (stopping at the question) or faking
(proceeding to the next question).
According to this decision tree model, the last step is
individuals' belief in their job capability. This is because before
individuals' making the final decision to fake the items, they also
consciously think about if they could demonstrate the expected
work behaviors. Blumberg and Pringle (1982) suggested that
faking is only possible when people have lower job performance
than the highest possible job performance/behavior of a given job.
For example, if the maximum requirements for a given position is
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to conduct 9 tasks, then someone who could perform the 9 tasks
successfully simple had no room to fake up. At the other extreme,
someone who could perform the lowest number of tasks (e.g., 1)
has the greatest opportunity to fake up. Hence, individuals’
perception of job capability moderates the relationship between
intention to fake and actual faking behaviors where people with
lower job capability are more likely to engage in applicant faking
behavior.

2.8.

Study design in faking research
There are two commonly used study designs in faking

research: between-subjects design and within-subjects design
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2006). For between-subjects
design, participants will be randomly assigned into two groups.
One group of participants will be asked to answer the personality
assessment with instructions designed to induce faking, whereas
the other group will be asked to produce an honest response. The
biggest concern with this type of study is the potential risk of
social desirability that makes it hard to reflect truly honest
responding (Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004). The second type of
study design in faking literature is a within-subjects design where
the same group of participants takes the personality assessment
twice at two different points of time: once in the condition of
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induced faking and the other when an honest response is
encouraged. There are several advantages of within-subjects design
over between-subjects design. First, the within-subjects design
could provide information regarding changes in scores caused by
faking (Converse, Oswald, Imus, Hedricks, Roy, & Butera, 2008).
Second, the within-subjects design could assess and statistically
control individual differences in faking, such as social desirability,
ability, and motivation to fake (McFarland & Ryan, 2000;
Mersman & Schultz, 1998). Therefore, the current study will
utilize the within-subjects design to examine the effects of faking.

2.9.

MTurk
Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) has become

increasingly popular as a data collection platform in experimental
and survey-based research (Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Paolacci &
Chandler, 2014; Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). However, the biggest
concern with the use of MTurk is associated with the sample
representativeness and employment status of the sample that will
have a great impact on the quality of study results. Buhrmester,
Kwang, and Gosling (2011) found that MTurk participants are
more representative than the college sample in terms of age and
ethnicity diversity. Many researchers questioned whether MTurk
participants are unemployed or only drawing from a narrow field
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of industries. However, Huff and Tingley (2015) found that MTurk
respondents’ occupations fall into various types of industries,
including 11.94% from the management field, 14.18% as
professionals, 17.24% from office and administrative support, etc.
Also, Casler, Bickel, and Hackett (2013) compared study results
for behavioral tests across three samples: 1) standard student
sample recruited on campus doing face to face test; 2) responses
collected from social media postings on Twitter, Facebook and
Reddit, and 3) participants from MTurk. The results show more
diversity in terms of social-economic status and ethnicity for
MTurk participants than the other two groups, but the test results
were not significantly different among the three groups. Besides,
Buhrmester et al. (2011) showed that MTurk participants provide
high-quality data and test-retest reliability equivalent to other data
collection methods. Also, the MTurk participants’ passing rates for
attention check items is similar to other data collection sources
(Hauser & Schwarz, 2016). Since evidence showing MTurk shows
the equivalent quality of data collection and even better diversity
of samples, I will use MTurk as a data collection platform in my
current study.
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2.10.

Model and Hypothesis
In conclusion, though personality assessment was found

predictable of performance outcomes, researchers still question its
utility in selection batteries due to its low reliability compared with
a cognitive test (Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck,
Murphy, & Schmitt, 2007). One of the biggest concerns associated
with personality assessment is the problem of faking. In this study,
certain relevant factors that affect people's perception and the
decision to fake behaviors are considered. If a well-established
model were developed, with a highly reliable measurement tool,
and an accurate detection system for identifying and excluding
frauds from the applicant pool, I may find personality measure to
demonstrate higher validity. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of the
current study is to develop a process model that captures both the
individual difference factors and situational factors affecting
people's intention and the decision to fake.
The review of the literature identifies several fundamental
theories as foundations for the current model. First, individuals
control their behaviors by controlling their perceptions. They
compare their perceptions of themselves (self-concept) with the
environment (perceived ideal applicant profile) and self-regulate
their behaviors to decrease any discrepancies through the negative
feedback loop based on Perceptual Control Theory (Powers, 1973).
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Second, the expectancy theory suggests that faking behaviors are
driven by motivational forces that demonstrate the benefits of
faking (Vroom, 1964). That is when there is no need to fake, or the
job is less attractive. There will be less intention to fake and,
therefore, less likely to induce actual faking behaviors. However,
when there is high job desirability, even if the disparity is low,
there might be an intention to fake. Third, the common theme of
the two faking models developed by McFarland and Ryan (2000)
and Snell et al. (1999) is that they both treat intention to fake and
actual faking as are two distinct constructs. Also, they both agree
that applicant faking is simultaneously affected by both
psychological factors and situational factors. Forth, according to
risk-return theory (Weber et al., 2002), an individual's preference
for risky options are affected by perceived risks. This suggests that
risk perceptions will influence people's choice of faking, and
individuals perceived faking as with low risk are likely to generate
larger intention to fake. In addition, I proposed that job capability,
the capacity of carrying out the job if hired, and moral
disengagement will moderate the relationship between intention to
fake and actual faking behaviors.

2.10.1.

Current model

Based on the literature review, I developed an integrated
process model of faking to examine the relationship between
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disparity and intention to fake, as well as the mediation effect of
intention to fake on the relationship between disparity and actual
faking behavior observations. Also, the study will also examine
whether job desirability moderates the relationship between
disparity and intention to fake as well as whether risk perceptions
will have a direct effect on the intention to fake. Lastly, I will also
examine if job capability and moral disengagement will have a
moderation effect on the relationship between intention to fake and
actual faking observation. The full model is shown below:

The following section discusses the models step by step,
along with the proposed hypotheses for testing each relationship.
The first hypothesis examined the potential impact of disparity on
the intention to fake. Though the majority of applicants may have
the motivation of getting hired, only a subgroup of them will
engage in actual faking behaviors. In order to examine the
interplay of explanatory variables between motivation and the endproduct of applicant faking behaviors, I propose that only
applicants with negative disparity between their scores and
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perceived ideal applicant score will have the intention to fake first
and then ultimately affect the way they distort their responses.
McFarland and Ryan (2000) examined many different factors
affecting people's intention to fake, and a common theme in those
studies is that they both agree intention to fake is influenced by
both individual difference factors and situational factors. However,
due to the complexity of the model and a large number of variables
proposed as affecting intention to fake, some parts of the model
remain untested. Also, previous studies examined many different
predictors to intention to fake but failed to examine which factors
determine the generation of intention to fake. In the current study,
instead of expanding the predictors pool by adding new factors
affecting intention to fake, I propose a new predictor of disparity
that plays the determining role in affecting people’s faking
decision.
Hence, this study contributes to the existing faking
literature by providing a more parsimonious model by examining
one of the core factors instead of the periphery factors influencing
intention to fake.
Hypothesis 1: Perceived disparity will have a
significant positive relationship with observed faking
scores.
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Hypothesis 2: The relationship between perceived
disparity and observed faking will be mediated by the level
of intention to fake.
I also examine whether the strength of the relationship
between disparity and intention to fake will be affected by the level
of job desirability. I believe that when there is positive or no
disparity between people's evaluation of their scores and perceived
ideal applicant score, test takers could still have high intention to
fake when the job they are applying for is highly valued or desired.
Hypothesis 3: The direct and indirect effects
between intention to fake and observed faking will be
moderated by job desirability (as first stage moderator)
through intention to fake.
I also proposed that moral disengagement and job
capability will moderate the relationship between intention to fake
and observed faking. Applicants who are high on moral
disengagement are less likely to feel distressed when engaging in
unethical conduct. Therefore, people who scored high on moral
disengagement would engage in more observed faking. However,
applicants who are high on job capability have low opportunity to
fake since they have a higher honest score that give them little
room to fake. Therefore, people with high job capability are less
likely to engage in observed faking. To conclude, I propose that
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moral disengagement positively predict observed faking while job
capability will negatively predict observed faking.
Hypothesis 4: The direct and indirect effects
between disparity and observed faking will be moderated
by moral disengagement and job capability (as second
stage moderators) through intention to fake.
Hypothesis 5: The direct and indirect effects
between disparity and observed faking will be moderated
by job desirability (as first stage moderator), moral
disengagement and job capability (as second stage
moderator) through
intention to fake.
Another factor affecting intention to fake directly is risk
perceptions. According to the risk-return framework, people's
preference for risk behaviors is affected by perceived risks. I
proposed that applicants with low-risk perceptions will have higher
chances of engaging in faking behaviors.
H6: Risk perception will have a significant negative
relationship with intention to fake.
The current study serves as an initial test of the construct of
disparity and its impact on faking behaviors. A process model of
faking was developed to answer the following questions: 1). Will
disparity influence faking? 2) How will intention to fake affect

54

faking observations? 3) Will job desirability and risk perceptions
influence intention to fake, and, 4) Will job capability and moral
disengagement affect faking observations.
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3. Methods
3.1.

Procedure
To answer the research questions, a survey-based study was

designed. Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk). MTurk platform is one of the most commonly used
data collection service platforms where participants complete
surveys and Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). To measure faking,
two HITs (Time 1 HIT and Time 2 HIT) were created to measure
workers’ personality at two conditions (applicant condition and
honest condition). To measure perceived disparity, participants
were instructed to take the personality items in terms of how they
think the ideal applicant would answer them. Perceived disparity
was then captured as the difference score between their perceived
ideal applicant scores and their own scores. To limit the potential
risks of cultural and language biases, Time 1 HIT was created and
open to U.S workers only. Once a participant accepted the HIT,
they were randomly redirected to one of the Qualtrics surveys
(applicant condition survey and honest condition survey). Two
weeks later, only those participants who have completed the Time
1 HIT were invited to take the T2 survey. To examine and
counterbalance the order effect of conditions on applicant faking
behaviors, participants who took the applicant condition survey in
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Time 1 HIT were invited to take the honest condition survey in
Time 2 HIT and those who took the honest condition survey in
Time 1 HIT were invited to take the applicant condition survey in
Time 2 HIT.
Before proceeding to the actual items, participants were
required to read through and accept the informed consent form of
the current study. In the applicant condition survey, the following
constructs were measured: personality, direct perceived disparity,
job capability, job desirability, job fit, risk perception, and
intention to fake. In the honest condition survey, the following
constructs were measured: personality, moral disengagement,
intention to fake, job desirability, risk perception, job capability,
job fit and demographic information. The demographic
information assisted the understanding of the sample.

3.2.

Participants
The Time 1 survey consisted of 253 participants who took

the applicant condition survey and 317 participants who took the
honest condition survey and they were compensated for $.50 for
participation of Time 1 survey. Both the applicant condition survey
and honest condition survey contains attention check items to
exclude participants who might not be paying attention to the
questions. After reviewing the data, participants with extensive
missing data and participants that failed the attention check were
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removed from further data analysis. 52 participants who took the
applicant condition survey were removed resulting a final sample
of 201 participants who took applicant condition survey in Time 1.
103 participants who took the honest condition survey were
removed resulting a final sample of 214 participants who took the
honest condition survey in Time 1. In Time 2, a total of 415
participants were invited to take the Time 2 survey. Among those,
201 participants were invited to take the honest condition survey
and 214 participants were invited to take the applicant condition
survey. In Time 2, 110 participants responded to the applicant
condition survey (51.40%) and 109 participants responded to the
honest condition survey (54.23%). The same process of reviewing
missing data and attention checks were conducted to select out
participants who were not eligible for the study. It resulted in 80
participants who took the applicant condition survey and 86
participants who took the honest condition survey in Time 2. All of
the study analyses were conducted using the final sample of 166
participants with 80 of them who took honest condition survey in
Time 1 and applicant condition survey in Time 2 and 86
participants who took the applicant condition survey in Time 1 and
honest condition survey in Time 2. The average age of the
participants was 38 years old, 68.7% of the sample were
Caucasian, 59% were male (n = 98 male; n = 67 female, n = 1
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unreported), and 75.3% were paid employees. The three highest
occupations of the participants were management, professional and
related (42.4%), service (16.4%) and sales and office (15.2%).
Additional demographics are reported in Table 1.
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Table 1. Demographics
Variables
Gender

Percent
Male 98(59%)
Female 67(40.4%)

Race
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other
Employment Status
Working (Paid Employee)
Working (Self-employed)
Not Working (temporary layoff from a job)
Not Working (looking for work)
Not Working (retired)
Not Working (disabled)
Not Working (Other)
Prefer not to answer
Years of working experience
never had a job before
less than 1 year
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
10 years or more
Occupation
Management, Professional, and related
Service
Sales and Office
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry
Construction, Extraction and Maintenance
Production, Transportation, and Material Moving
Government
Retired
Unemployed
Sample Total
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114(68.7%)
17(10.2%)
5(3%)
24(14.5%)
0(0%)
6(3.6%)
125(75.3%)
23(13.9%)
4(2.4%)
5(3%)
1(.6%)
5(3%)
0(0%)
3(1.8%)
1(.6%)
4(2.4%)
30(18.1%)
33(19.9%)
6(3.6%)
91(54.8%)
70(42.4%)
27(16.3%)
25(15.1%)
1(.6%)
5(3%)
10(6%)
12(7.2%)
1(.6%)
14(8.4%)
166

3.3.

Measure

Personality Traits
The Big Five dimensions of personality traits were
measured using the Mini-IPIP scale (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, &
Lucas, 2006) in the current study. There were 20 items in total, and
participants were asked to indicate how much they agree with the
statements on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly
disagree to 5 = strongly agree. There were four items for each Big
Five trait, and each subscale has internal consistency reliability
equal or well above .60. The table below shows the corresponding
reliability and a sample item for each personality dimension.
Table 1. Mini IPIP scale dimensions with sample item
Mini-IPIP
dimensions

alpha

sample item

Extraversion

0.77

I am the life of the party.

Agreeableness

0.70

I sympathize with others'
feelings.

Conscientious
ness

0.69

I get chores done right
away.

Emotional
Stability

0.68

I have frequent mood
swings.

Intellect

0.65

I have a vivid
imagination.
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Job desirability
Job desirability was measured using the job desirability
scale adapted from Ferdik, Smith, and Applegate (2014). There
were five items in total, and participants were asked to read a
detailed job description for an entry-level customer service
manager's position and rate how much they agree with the
following statement on a 1-5 Likert scale with one meaning
strongly disagree, and five means strongly agree. A sample item is
"Among all jobs, being a customer service manager is my first
choice." The internal consistency reliability for the scale is .75.
Intention to fake
Intention to fake was measured using adapted Intention to
Fake scale developed by Lester, Anglim, and Fullarton (2015).
There were three items in total (“I can imagine times when I might
lie or exaggerate my abilities while applying for the job even if I
hadn’t planned to.” “I would never lie while applying for this job.”
“I would exaggerate the truth about my skills or abilities or
experience while applying for this job”). After showing
participants with the detailed job descriptions for the entry-level
customer service manager positions, participants were asked to rate
how much they agree with the following statements on a 1-5 Likert
scale with 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The internal
consistency reliability for this scale is .83.
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Moral disengagement
Moral disengagement was measured using the Morally
Disengage Scale developed by Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, and
Mayer (2012). Eight items from scale were included in the current
study. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on
the following statements using a 1-5 Likert scale ranging from 1 =
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The internal consistency
reliability is .88, and a sample item is "Considering the ways
people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly a sin to inflate
your own credentials a bit."
Job Capability
The capacity for carrying out the job was measured using
the job self-efficacy scale developed by Riggs, Warka, Babasa,
Betancourt, and Hooker (1994). There were ten items in total.
Participants were shown with a detailed job description for an
entry-level customer service manager position and think about
their ability to do the tasks required by THIS job. Also, they were
be asked to rate how much they agree with the following
statements on a 1-5 Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly
disagree, and 5 = strongly disagree about their skills and ability to
perform THIS job. The internal consistency reliability for this
scale is .87. A sample item is "I have confidence in my ability to
do THIS job."
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Risk Assessment
Risk assessment measure was adapted from the risk scale
developed by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). There were three items
in total. The participants were first asked to indicate “the
likelihood of engaging in overstating the truth to look better when
applying for a job” on a 1-5 Likert scale ranging from 1 = very
unlikely to 5 = very likely. The second item asked participants to
rate the risk level by asking "how risky do you perceive overstating
the truth to look better when applying for a job" on a 1-5 Likert
scale with 1 = not risky at all to 5 = extremely risky. Lastly,
participants were asked to “indicates the benefits you would obtain
from overstating the truth to look better when applying for a job”
on a 1-5 Likert scale ranging from 1 = no benefits at all to 5 = a
great deal of benefits.
Perceived job-fit
General job-fit is adapted from the demands-abilities fit
measure developed by Cable and Judge (1996). There were three
items in total. The internal consistency reliability of the scale
is .84. Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with
the following statements on a 1-5 Likert scale with 1 = strongly
disagree to 5 = strongly disagree. A sample item is “My abilities
and training are a good fit with the requirements of THIS job I am
applying for now.”
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The analysis was conducted using SPSS version 25 for
hypothesis 1through hypothesis 6. In order to test the relationship
between disparity and intention to fake as well as the subsequent
relationship with actual faking, I conducted moderated-mediation
analyses using Process macro (Hayes, 2008) model 4, model 7,
model 16, and model 2.
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4. Results
In order to examine whether the order of conditions has a
significant effect on people’s personality scores, I conducted
independent sample t test to examine whether people who took
honest condition first and people who took applicant condition first
would have different honest personality scores and different
applicant personality scores. Independent sample t test results
suggest that participants’ personality scores in honest condition
and applicant conditions were not significantly different when
comparing people who took honest condition first and people who
took applicant condition first. This indicate that the order of which
conditions participants took in the study did not have a significant
impact on their faking behaviors nor honest behaviors when
answering personality items. Therefore, score distortion in
applicant condition was not due to practice effect but due to
intentional applicant faking behaviors. Means, standard deviation
and t test output for personality scores in honest condition and
personality scores in applicant conditions are displayed in Table 2
and Table 3.
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for personality
traits measured in three conditions: honest condition, perceived
ideal applicant condition and applicant condition are displayed in

66

Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the
variables in the model are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6. Initial
correlations among all study variables show general support of the
hypothesis. However, moral disengagement and intention to fake
showed negative relationship with faking which is opposite to the
prediction. According to the hypothesis, moral disengagement
should positively predict faking which means people who are more
morally disengaged should engage in more applicant faking
behavior, but the negative correlation results suggested that in our
study people who are more morally disengaged tend to engage in
less faking. Similarly, I predicted that people who have more
intention to fake should engage in more applicant faking behaviors
but the negative correlation between intention to fake and faking
scores suggested that in the current study, people with more
intention to fake engage in less faking. Potential reasons for these
inconsistent results will be explained later
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Table 2. Compare conditions (personality scores in honest condition)
Personality Traits
Group
N
M
SD
t
df
1
80 3.04
1.00
extraversion
1.83
164
2
80 2.76
0.96
1
80 3.7
0.86
agreeableness
-0.27
164
2
80 3.74
0.81
1
80 3.66
0.79
conscientiousness
0.68
164
2
80 3.58
0.75
1
80 3.53
0.90
emotional stability
0.26
164
2
80 3.5
0.8
1
80 3.64
1.04
intellect
-0.041
164
2
80 3.65
0.96
Note. Group 1 = honest condition first; Group 2 = applicant condition first
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p
0.069
0.79
0.50
0.80
0.97

Table 3. Compare conditions (personality scores in applicant condition)
Personality Traits
Group N
M
SD
t
df
1
86 3.53
0.96
extraversion
1.06
164
2
86 3.36
1.07
1
86 3.74
0.98
agreeableness
0.096
164
2
86 3.64
0.90
1
86 4.09
0.78
conscientiousness
0.091
164
2
86 4.00
0.81
1
86 3.95
0.90
emotional stability
0.35
164
2
86 3.9
0.88
1
86 3.93
1.08
intellect
-0.011
164
2
86 3.94
0.93
Note. Group 1 = honest condition first; Group 2 = applicant condition first
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p
0.29
0.51
0.46
0.72
0.94
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4.1.
Disparity and faking outcome
relationships
The correlations reported in Table 5 and Table 6 supports
Hypothesis 1, that perceived disparity of extraversion,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability and intellect
had a significant positive relationship with faking observations of
corresponding personality traits measured using regression
adjusted difference score and simple difference score between
honest condition and applicant condition. Additional multiple
regression analysis further supports Hypothesis 1, with disparity of
extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability
and intellect explaining 7.6% of the variance in faking scores of
extraversions measured using regression adjusted difference score,
F (5,160) = 2.62, p < .05, R2 = .076. Disparity of conscientiousness
was the only significant predictor (b = .24, t (160) = 2.46, p < .05).
When using disparity of extraversion alone to predict regression
adjusted difference scores of extraversions, disparity of
extraversion explains 3.9% of the variance in faking scores of
extraversions, b = .14, t (164) = 2.57, p < .05, R2 = .039. When
examining observed faking using simple difference scores, five
personality traits together explaining 32.90% of the variance in
simple difference scores of extraversions, F (5,160) = 15.72, p
< .05, R2 = .329. Disparity of extraversion (b = .44, t (160) = 6.53,
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p < .05) and disparity of conscientiousness (b = .19, t (160) = 2.02,
p < .05) were the only two significant predictors. When using
disparity of extraversion as the only predictor, disparity of
extraversion explains 31.2% of the variance of simple difference
scores of extraversions, b = .45, t (164) = 8.62, p < .05, R2 = .312.
The same is true for faking scores of agreeableness.
Disparity of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness,
emotional stability and intellect together predict 19.50% of the
variance in faking scores of agreeableness measured using
regression adjusted difference score, F (5,160) = 7.75, p < .05, R2
= .195. Disparity of agreeableness (b = .24, t (160) = 3.41, p < .05)
and disparity of conscientiousness (b = .25, t (160) = 3.50, p < .05)
were significant predictors. When using disparity of agreeableness
alone to predict regression adjusted difference scores of
agreeableness, disparity of agreeableness explained 11.80% of the
variance of faking residual scores of agreeableness, b = .28, t (164)
= 4.68, p < .05, R2 = .118. When examining observed faking using
simple difference scores, five personality traits together explained
27.5% of the variance of simple difference scores of agreeableness,
F (5,160) = 12.16, p < .05, R2 = .275. Disparity of agreeableness (b
= .39, t (160) = 5.68, p < .05) and disparity of conscientiousness (b
= .22, t (160) = 3.10, p < .05) were the only two significant
predictors. When using disparity of agreeableness as the only
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predictor, it explains 22.80% of the variance of simple difference
scores of agreeableness, b = .40, t (164) = 6.97, p < .05, R2 = .228.
When examining faking scores of conscientiousness, disparity of
five personality traits together predict 22.90% of the variance in
regression adjusted difference scores of conscientiousness (F
(5,160) = 9.52, p < .05, R2 = .229) and 34.80% of the variance in
simple difference scores of conscientiousness (F (5,160) = 17.05, p
< .05, R2 = .348). Disparity of conscientiousness (b = .23, t (160) =
3.50, p < .05) and disparity of emotional stability (b = .17, t (160)
= 2.75, p < .05) significantly predict regression adjusted difference
scores of conscientiousness. Disparity of conscientiousness (b
= .47, t (160) = 6.93, p < .05) and disparity of emotional stability
(b = .18, t (160) = 2.88, p < .05) were also the only two significant
predictors for simple difference scores of conscientiousness. When
using disparity of conscientiousness alone, it significantly
predicted regression adjusted difference scores of
conscientiousness (b = .34, t (164) = 5.38, p < .05, R2 = .15) and
simple difference scores of conscientiousness (b = .55, t (164) =
8.42, p < .05, R2 = .30).
For observed faking scores of emotional stability, disparity
of five personality traits together predict 23.90% of the variance in
regression adjusted difference scores of emotional stability (F
(5,160) = 10.08, p < .05, R2 = .239) and 41.10% of the variance in
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simple difference scores of emotional stability (F (5,160) = 22.35,
p < .05, R2 = .41). Disparity of conscientiousness (b = .30, t (160)
= 4.15, p < .05) and disparity of emotional stability (b = .18, t
(160) = 2.61, p < .05) significantly predict regression adjusted
difference scores of emotional stabilities. Disparity of
conscientiousness (b = .28, t (160) = 3.97, p < .05) and disparity of
emotional stability (b = .48, t (160) = 7.34, p < .05) were also the
only two significant predictors for simple difference scores of
emotional stabilities. When using disparity of emotional stability
alone, it significantly predicted regression adjusted difference
scores of emotional stability (b = .31, t (164) = 5.14, p < .05, R2
= .14) and simple difference scores of emotional stability (b = .54,
t (164) = 9.36, p < .05, R2 = .35).
Lastly, for observed faking scores of intellect, disparity of
five personality traits together predict 13.50% of the variance in
regression adjusted difference scores of intellect (F (5,160) = 4.98,
p < .05, R2 = .135) and 25.90% of the variance in simple difference
scores of intellect (F (5,160) = 11.16, p < .05, R2 = .259). Disparity
of conscientiousness (b = .19, t (160) = 2.59, p < .05) and disparity
of intellect (b = .22, t (160) = 3.19, p < .05) significantly predict
regression adjusted difference scores of intellects. Disparity of
conscientiousness (b = .16, t (160) = 2.11, p < .05) and disparity of
intellect (b = .43, t (160) = 6.31, p < .05) were also the only two
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significant predictors for simple difference scores of intellects.
When using disparity of intellect alone, it significantly predicted
regression adjusted difference scores of intellects (b = .24, t (164)
= 3.94, p < .05, R2 = .086) and simple difference scores of
intellects (b = .43, t (164) = 7.14, p < .05, R2 = .24).
In conclusion, when using disparity of all 5 personality
traits to predict observed faking, the model is significant. Also, the
effect of the model is larger when using simple difference scores
than using regression adjusted residual scores. In addition,
disparity of conscientiousness significantly predicts faking scores
of all five personality traits.

4.2.

Mediation Relationship
Regression analysis with Hayes (2018) PROCESS macro

were used to examine the mediation effect between perceived
disparity and observed faking through intention to fake
(Hypothesis 2), ten different mediation analysis were conducted to
examine the relationship between disparity and observed faking
scores of the corresponding personality dimension (i.e., the
relationship between disparity of extraversion and faking observed
scores of extraversion). Observed faking were examined in two
ways: regression adjusted difference score and simple difference
scores. Besides that, eight additional mediation analysis were
conducted to examine the relationship between disparity of
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conscientiousness and faking scores of the other four personality
dimensions. None of the mediation analysis results revealed
significant indirect effects for faking through intention to fake.
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
Faking extraversion. To test for mediation for regression adjusted
difference scores of extraversions, mediation analysis using
PROCESS model 4 was conducted and the results suggested that
disparity of extraversion alone did not significantly predict
intention to fake (b = -.074, p = .47). However, using both
disparity of extraversion and intention to fake to predict regression
adjusted difference score of extraversions, disparity of extraversion
positively predicted regression adjusted difference score of
extraversion, b = .14, p < .05 but intention to fake did not
significantly predict regression adjusted difference score of
extraversion (b = -.013, p = .75). The indirect effect for the model
predicting regression adjusted difference score of extraversion
were not significant, b = .0010, BootSE = .0066,
BootCI[-.0076, .0202].
To test for mediation for simple difference score of
extraversions, mediation analysis using Process model 4 was
conducted. Mediation analysis results suggested disparity of
extraversion alone did not significantly predict intention to fake (b
= -.074, p = .47). However, using both disparity of extraversion
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and intention to fake to predict simple difference score of
extraversions, disparity of extraversion positively predicted simple
difference score of extraversion, b = .45, p < .05, but intention to
fake did not significantly predict simple difference scores of
extraversion (b = .018, p = .66). The indirect effects for the model
predicting simple difference score of extraversion were not
significant, b = -.0013, BootSE = .0065, BootCI[-.012, .016].
Faking agreeableness. To test for mediation for regression
adjusted difference scores of agreeableness, mediation analysis
using PROCESS model 4 was conducted and the results suggested
that disparity of agreeableness alone did not significantly predict
intention to fake (b = -.20, p = .18). However, using both disparity
of agreeableness and intention to fake to predict regression
adjusted difference score of agreeableness, disparity of
agreeableness positively predicted faking agreeableness, b = .27, p
< .05, but intention to fake did not significantly predict faking
agreeableness (b = -.054, p = .088). The indirect effects for the
model predicting regression adjusted difference score of
agreeableness were not significant, b = .011, BootSE = .013,
BootCI[-.0052, .043].
To test for mediation for simple difference scores of
agreeableness, mediation analysis results suggested disparity of
agreeableness alone did not significantly predict intention to fake
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(b = -.20, p = .18). However, using both disparity of agreeableness
and intention to fake to predict simple difference score of
agreeableness, disparity of agreeableness positively predicted
faking scores of agreeableness, b = .40, p < .05, but intention to
fake did not significantly predict faking scores of agreeableness (b
= -.012, p = .71). The indirect effects for the model predicting
simple difference score of agreeableness were not significant, b
= .0023, BootSE = .0090, BootCI[-.012, .026].
Faking conscientiousness. To test for mediation for regression
adjusted difference scores of conscientiousness, mediation analysis
using PROCESS model 4 was conducted and the results suggested
that disparity of conscientiousness alone did not significantly
predict intention to fake (b = .031, p = .85). However, using both
disparity of conscientiousness and intention to fake to predict
regression adjusted difference score of conscientiousness, disparity
of conscientiousness positively predicted faking scores of
conscientiousness, b = .34, p < .05, and intention to fake negatively
predict faking scores of conscientiousness (b = -.11, p < .05). The
indirect effect for the model predicting regression adjusted
difference score of faking conscientiousness were not significant, b
= -.0033, BootSE = .018, BootCI[-.039, .034].
To test for mediation for simple difference scores of
conscientiousness, mediation analysis results suggested disparity
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of conscientiousness alone did not significantly predict intention to
fake (b = .031 p = .85). However, using both disparity of
conscientiousness and intention to fake to predict simple difference
score of conscientiousness, disparity of conscientiousness
positively predicted faking score of conscientiousness, b = .53, p
< .05, but intention to fake did not significantly predict faking
score of conscientiousness (b = -.028, p = .34). The indirect effect
for the model predicting simple difference score of faking
conscientiousness were not significant, b = -.0009, BootSE
= .0068, BootCI[-.016, .014].
Faking emotional stability. To test for mediation for regression
adjusted difference score of emotional stability, mediation analysis
using PROCESS model 4 was conducted and the results suggested
that disparity of emotional stability alone did not significantly
predict intention to fake (b = .025, p = .86). However, using both
disparity of emotional stability and intention to fake to predict
regression adjusted difference score of emotional stability,
disparity of emotional stability positively predicted faking score of
emotional stability, b = .31, p < .05, and intention to fake
negatively predict faking score of emotional stability (b = -.11,
p<.005). The indirect effects for the model predicting regression
adjusted difference score of faking emotional stability were not
significant, b = -.0028, BootSE = .020, BootCI[-.038, .042].
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To test for mediation for simple difference score of emotional
stability, mediation analysis results suggested disparity of
emotional stability alone did not significantly predict intention to
fake (b = .025, p = .86). However, using both disparity of
emotional stability and intention to fake to predict simple
difference score of emotional stability, disparity of emotional
stability positively predicted faking score of emotional stability , b
= .54, p < .05, but intention to fake did not significantly predict
faking score of emotional stability (b = -.027, p = .39). The indirect
effects for the model predicting simple difference score of
emotional stability were not significant, b = -.007, BootSE = .0067,
BootCI[-.013, .017].
Faking intellect. To test for mediation for regression adjusted
difference score of intellect, mediation analysis using PROCESS
model 4 was conducted and the results suggested that disparity of
intellect alone did not significantly predict intention to fake (b
= .14, p = .34). However, using both disparity of intellect and
intention to fake to predict regression adjusted difference score of
intellect, disparity of intellect positively predicted faking score of
intellect, b = .24, p < .05, but intention to fake did not significantly
predict faking score of intellect (b = -.017, p = .60). The indirect
effects for the model predicting regression adjusted difference
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score of intellect were not significant, b = -.0024, BootSE = .0084,
BootCI[-.023, .012].
To test for mediation for simple difference score of
intellect, mediation analysis results suggested disparity of intellect
alone did not significantly predict intention to fake (b = .14, p
= .34). However, using both disparity of intellect and intention to
fake to predict simple difference score of intellect, disparity of
intellect positively predicted faking score of intellect, b = .43, p
< .05, but intention to fake did not significantly predict faking
score of intellect (b = .031, p = .33). The indirect effects for the
model predicting simple difference score of faking intellect were
not significant, b = .0044, BootSE = .0088, BootCI[-.0092, .027].
Disparity of conscientiousness affecting faking scores of other
traits. In previous section, disparity of conscientiousness was
found to be significantly related to faking scores of all personality
traits besides faking scores of conscientiousness. Therefore, I
explored the mediation effect of intention to fake on the
relationships between disparity of conscientiousness and faking
scores of the other four personality traits (extraversion,
agreeableness, emotional stability and intellect). When examining
the relationship between disparity of conscientiousness and
regression adjusted difference score of extraversions measured,
results suggested that disparity of conscientiousness alone did not
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significantly predict intention to fake (b = .031, p = .85). However,
when using disparity of conscientiousness and intention to fake
together to predict regression adjusted difference score of
extraversion, disparity of conscientiousness positively predicted
faking score of extraversion, b = .27, p < .05, but intention to fake
did not significantly predict faking score of extraversion, b = -.021,
p = .61. The indirect effects for the model predicting regression
adjusted difference score of extraversion were not significant, b =
-.0006, BootSE = .0087, BootCI[-.018, .020]. When examining the
relationship between disparity of conscientiousness and simple
difference score of extraversions, results suggested that disparity of
conscientiousness alone did not significantly predict intention to
fake (b = .031, p = .85). However, when using disparity of
conscientiousness and intention to fake together to predict simple
difference score of extraversions, disparity of conscientiousness
positively predict faking score of extraversion, b = .37, p < .05, but
intention to fake did not significantly predict faking score of
extraversion, b = -.0040, p = .93. The indirect effects for the model
predicting simple difference score of extraversion were not
significant, b = -.0001, BootSE = .0074, BootCI[-.015, .018].
When examining the relationship between disparity of
conscientiousness and regression adjusted difference score of
agreeableness, results suggested that disparity of conscientiousness
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alone did not significantly predict intention to fake (b = .031, p
= .85). However, when using disparity of conscientiousness and
intention to fake together to predict regression adjusted difference
score of agreeableness, disparity of conscientiousness positively
predict faking score of agreeableness, b = .31, p < .05, and
intention to fake negatively predict faking score of agreeableness,
b = -.071, p < .05. The indirect effects for the model predicting
regression adjusted difference score of faking agreeableness were
not significant, b = -.0022, BootSE = .0013, BootCI[-.028, .025].
When examining the relationship between disparity of
conscientiousness and simple difference score of agreeableness,
results suggested that disparity of conscientiousness alone did not
significantly predict intention to fake (b = .031, p = .85). However,
when using disparity of conscientiousness and intention to fake
together to predict simple difference score of agreeableness,
disparity of conscientiousness positively predict faking score of
agreeableness, b = .30, p < .05, but intention to fake did not
significantly predict faking score of agreeableness, b = -.0036, p
= .28. The indirect effects for the model predicting simple
difference score of agreeableness were not significant, b = -.0015,
BootSE = .012, BootCI[-.019, .018].
When examining the relationship between disparity of
conscientiousness and regression adjusted difference score of
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emotional stability, results suggested that disparity of
conscientiousness alone did not significantly predict intention to
fake (b = .031, p = .85). However, when using disparity of
conscientiousness and intention to fake together to predict
regression adjusted difference score of emotional stability,
disparity of conscientiousness positively predict faking score of
emotional stability, b = .41, p < .05, and intention to fake
negatively predict faking score of emotional stability, b = -.11, p
< .05. The indirect effect for the model predicting regression
adjusted difference score of emotional stability was not significant,
b = -.0035, BootSE = .020, BootCI[-.039, .039]. When examining
the relationship between disparity of conscientiousness and simple
difference score of emotional stability, results suggested that
disparity of conscientiousness alone did not significantly predict
intention to fake (b = .031, p = .85). However, when using
disparity of conscientiousness and intention to fake together to
predict simple difference score of emotional stability, disparity of
conscientiousness positively predict faking score of emotional
stability, b = .44, p < .05, but intention to fake did not significantly
predict faking score of emotional stability, b = .0043, p = .91. The
indirect effect for the model predicting simple difference score of
emotional stability was not significant, b = .0001, BootSE = .0073,
BootCI[-.012, .022].
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When examining the relationship between disparity of
conscientiousness and regression adjusted difference score of
intellect, results suggested that disparity of conscientiousness alone
did not significantly predict intention to fake (b = .031, p = .85).
However, when using disparity of conscientiousness and intention
to fake together to predict regression adjusted difference score of
intellect, disparity of conscientiousness positively predicted faking
score of intellect, b = .23, p < .05, but intention to fake did not
significantly predict faking score of intellect, b = -.0090, p = .79.
The indirect effect for the model predicting regression adjusted
difference score of intellect was not significant, b = -.0003, BootSE
= .0013, BootCI[-.012, .016]. When examining the relationship
between disparity of conscientiousness and simple difference score
of intellect, results suggested that disparity of conscientiousness
alone did not significantly predict intention to fake (b = .031, p
= .85). However, when using disparity of conscientiousness and
intention to fake together to predict simple difference score of
intellect, disparity of conscientiousness positively predict faking
score of intellect, b = .19, p < .05, but intention to fake did not
significantly predict faking score of intellect, b = .047, p = .19. The
indirect effect for the model predicting simple difference score of
intellect was not significant, b = .0015, BootSE = .010,
BootCI[-.018, .027].
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4.3.

Moderated Mediation

4.3.1. First Stage Moderated Mediation
Hypothesis 3 proposed that the relationship between
disparity and faking would be moderated by job desirability (first
stage moderator) through intention to fake. To test the first stage
moderated mediation model, the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018)
model 7 was used. Table 7 and Table 8 represent the direct and
indirect effects of faking outcome measured using regression
adjusted difference scores and simple difference scores. The results
revealed that Hypothesis 3 was not fully supported.
Faking extraversion. When examining the relationship between
disparity of extraversion and regression adjusted difference score
of extraversions, the results suggested that the interaction between
disparity of extraversion and job desirability regressed on intention
to fake revealed significant effect (b = -.22, p < .05). Figure 3.
below showed the interaction effect. The results suggested that
when perceived disparity of extraversion is negative or slightly
positive, people who perceived high level of job desirability have
higher intention to fake. However, as perceived disparity becomes
more positive which means people who believe they are
moderately or extremely better than the ideal applicant, people’s
intention to fake was lower even if the job is with high level of
desirability to them.
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The direct effect of disparity of extraversion on regression
adjusted difference score of extraversion was moderated by job
desirability such that the conditional direct effect was only
significant when job desirability is at high level ( +1 SD above the
mean; b = -.33, SE = .15, p < .05, 95% CI[-.62, -.036]). The
conditional indirect effect was not significant. When examining the
relationship between disparity of extraversion and simple
difference score of extraversions, the results suggested that the
interaction between disparity of extraversion and job desirability
regressed on intention to fake revealed significant effect (b = -.22,
p < .05). The direct effect of disparity of extraversion on simple
difference score of extraversion was moderated by job desirability
such that the conditional direct effect was only significant when
job desirability is at high level ( +1 SD above the mean; b = -.33,
SE = .15, p < .05, 95% CI[-.62, -.036]). The conditional indirect
effects were not significant.
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Faking agreeableness. When examining the relationship between
disparity of agreeableness and regression adjusted difference score
of agreeableness, the results suggested that the interaction between
disparity of agreeableness and job desirability regressed on
intention to fake revealed non-significant effect (b = -.15, p = .25).
This suggested that job desirability did not moderate the
relationship between disparity of agreeableness and regression
adjusted difference score of agreeableness through intention to
fake. When examining the relationship between disparity of
agreeableness and simple difference score of agreeableness, the
results suggested that the interaction between disparity of
agreeableness and job desirability regressed on intention to fake
revealed non-significant effect (b = -.15, p = .25). This suggested
that job desirability did not moderate the relationship between
disparity of agreeableness and simple difference score of
agreeableness through intention to fake.
Faking conscientiousness. When examining the relationship
between disparity of conscientiousness and regression adjusted
difference score of conscientiousness, the results suggested that the
interaction between disparity of conscientiousness and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect (b = -.39, p < .05). Figure 4. Below showed the interaction
effect. The results suggested that when perceived disparity of
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consciousness is negative or slightly positive (people who
perceived themselves as having lower consciousness score or just
the same consciousness score compared with the ideal applicant),
those who perceived high level of job desirability have higher
intention to fake.

The conditional direct effect and conditional indirect
effects of disparity of conscientiousness on regression adjusted
difference score of conscientiousness were not significant. When
examining the relationship between disparity of conscientiousness
and simple difference score of conscientiousness, the results
suggested that the interaction between disparity of
conscientiousness and job desirability regressed on intention to
fake revealed significant effect (b = -.39, p < .05). The conditional
direct and indirect effects were not significant.
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Faking emotional stability. When examining the relationship
between disparity of emotional stability and regression adjusted
difference score of emotional stability, the results suggested that
the interaction between disparity of emotional stability and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect (b = -.27, p < .05). Figure 5. below showed the interaction
effect. The results suggested that when perceived disparity of
emotional stability is negative or slightly positive (people who
perceived themselves as having lower score of emotional stability
or just the same score of emotional stability compared with the
ideal applicant), those who perceived high level of job desirability
have higher intention to fake.

The conditional direct and indirect effect of disparity of
emotional stability on regression adjusted difference score of
emotional stability were not significant. When examining the
relationship between disparity of emotional stability and simple
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difference score of emotional stability, the results suggested that
the interaction between disparity of emotional stability and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect (b = -.27, p < .05). The direct and indirect effects of disparity
of emotional stability on simple difference score of emotional
stability were not significant.
Faking intellect. When examining the relationship between
disparity of intellect and regression adjusted difference score of
intellect, the results suggested that the interaction between
disparity of intellect and job desirability regressed on intention to
fake revealed non-significant effect (b = -.15, p = .24). The
conditional direct and indirect effect were not significant. When
examining the relationship between disparity of intellect and
simple difference score of intellect, the results suggested that the
interaction between disparity of intellect and job desirability
regressed on intention to fake revealed non-significant effect (b =
-.15, p = .24). The conditional direct and indirect effect were not
significant.
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4.3.2. Second Stage Moderated Mediation
Additionally, the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018) model
16 was used to explore Hypothesis 4 which proposed that moral
disengagement and job capability together would moderate the
relationship between disparity and faking through intention to fake
as two second stage moderators. Table 9a to 9e represent the direct
and indirect effects of faking outcome measured using regression
adjusted difference scores and Table 10a to 10e represent the direct
and indirect effects of faking outcome measured using simple
difference scores (Appendix). The results revealed that Hypothesis
4 were partially supported.
Faking extraversion. The interaction between intention to fake
and job capability regressed on regression adjusted difference
score of extraversions revealed significant effect, b = -.17, p < .05.
Figure 6 below showed the interaction effect. The results suggested
that people with low job capability observed larger amount of
faking efforts than people with average and high level of job
capability. However, only people with extremely high level of
intention to fake faked in the correct direction.
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However, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on regression adjusted difference score of
extraversions revealed non-significant effect, b = -.028, p = .36.
The direct effect of disparity of extraversion on regression adjusted
difference score of extraversion was conditionally moderated by
job capability and moral disengagement such that when moral
disengagement is at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
from low level (-1 SD below the mean; b = .39, SE = .073, p < .05,
95% CI[.24, .53]) to mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .20, SE
= .052, p < .05, 95% CI[.093, .30]). This suggested that conditional
direct effect size decreases as job capability increases at low level
of moral disengagement. When moral disengagement is at mean
level (SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct effect size
decreases when job capability increases from low level((-1 SD
below the mean; b = .35, SE = .063, p < .05, 95% CI [.23, .48]) to
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mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .16, SE = .045, p < .05, 95%
CI [.072, .25]). When moral disengagement is at high level (+1 SD
above the mean), the conditional direct effect was only significant
when job capability is at low level (-1 SD below the mean; b = .29,
SE = .090, p < .05, 95% CI [.12, .47]). The conditional indirect
effects were not significant.
The interaction between intention to fake and job capability
regressed on simple difference score of extraversions revealed
significant effect, b = -.16, p < .05. Figure 7. below showed the
interaction effect. The results suggested that people with low job
capability observed larger amount of faking efforts than people
with average and high level of job capability. However, only
people with extremely high level of intention to fake faked in the
correct direction.

However, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on simple difference score of extraversions
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revealed non-significant effect, b = -.035, p = .26. The direct effect
of disparity of extraversion on faking score of extraversion was
conditionally moderated by job capability and moral
disengagement such that when moral disengagement is at low
level(-1 SD below the mean), the conditional direct effect size
decreases as job capability increases from low level (-1 SD below
the mean; b = .36, SE = .075, p < .05, 95% CI[.21, .51]) to mean
level (SD equal to the mean; b = .18, SE = .054, p < .05, 95%
CI[.078, .29]). This suggested that conditional direct effect size
decreases as job capability increases at low level of moral
disengagement. When moral disengagement is at mean level (SD
equal to the mean), the conditional direct effect size decreases
when job capability increases from low level((-1 SD below the
mean; b = .32, SE = .064, p < .05, 95% CI [.19, .45]) to mean level
(SD equal to the mean; b = .14, SE = .046, p < .05, 95% CI
[.049, .23]). When moral disengagement is at high level (+1 SD
above the mean), the conditional direct effect was only significant
when job capability is at low level (-1 SD below the mean; b = .24,
SE = .092, p < .05, 95% CI [.062, .43]). The conditional indirect
effects were not significant.
Faking agreeableness. The interaction between intention to fake
and job capability regressed on regression adjusted difference
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score of agreeableness revealed significant effect, b = -.074, p
< .05. Figure 8. Below showed the effect of the interaction.

In addition, the interaction between intention to fake and moral
disengagement on regression adjusted difference score of
agreeableness revealed a significant effect, b = -.053, p < .05.
Figure 9 below showed the interaction effect. The results showed
that people with low moral disengagement score to fake had larger
amount of faking than people with average and high moral
disengagement score which was opposite to our prediction. This
was examined in the discussion session later.
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The direct effect of disparity of agreeableness on faking
score of agreeableness was conditionally moderated by job
capability and moral disengagement such that when moral
disengagement is at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
from low level (-1 SD below the mean; b = .19, SE = .058, p < .05,
95% CI[.072, .30]) to mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .11,
SE = .041, p < .05, 95% CI[.025, .19]). This suggested that
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
at low level of moral disengagement. When moral disengagement
is at mean level (SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct
effect size was only significant at low level of job capability ((-1
SD below the mean; b = .12, SE = .051, p < .05, 95% CI
[.021, .22]). When moral disengagement is at high level (+1 SD
above the mean), the conditional direct effect was not significant.
Also, none of the conditional indirect effects were significant.
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The interaction between intention to fake and job capability
regressed on simple difference score of agreeableness revealed
significant effect, b = -.075, p < .05. Figure 10. Below showed the
interaction effect.

In addition, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on simple difference score of agreeableness
revealed a significant effect, b = -.057, p < .05. Figure 11 below
showed the interaction effect. The pattern of the interaction effect
still suggested that people with low moral disengagement score
tend to have larger amount of faking on agreeableness measured
using simple difference score.
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The direct effect of disparity of agreeableness on faking
score of agreeableness was conditionally moderated by job
capability and moral disengagement such that when moral
disengagement is at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
from low level (-1 SD below the mean; b = .19, SE = .061, p < .05,
95% CI[.069, .31]) to mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .11,
SE = .043, p < .05, 95% CI[.022, .19]). This suggested that
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
at low level of moral disengagement. When moral disengagement
is at mean level (SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct
effect size was only significant at low level of job capability ((-1
SD below the mean; b = .12, SE = .051, p < .05, 95% CI
[.013, .22]). When moral disengagement is at high level (+1 SD
above the mean), the conditional direct effect was not significant.
Also, none of the conditional indirect effects were significant.
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Faking conscientiousness. The interaction between intention to
fake and job capability regressed on regression adjusted difference
score of conscientiousness revealed non-significant effect, b =
-.017, p = .55. In addition, the interaction between intention to fake
and moral disengagement on faking score of conscientiousness
revealed a non-significant effect, b = -.038, p = .086. The direct
effect and indirect effect of disparity of conscientiousness on
faking score of conscientiousness were not significant. The
interaction between intention to fake and job capability regressed
on simple difference score of conscientiousness revealed nonsignificant effect, b = -.032, p = .31. In addition, the interaction
between intention to fake and moral disengagement on simple
difference score of conscientiousness revealed a non-significant
effect, b = -.044, p = .082. The direct effect and indirect effect of
disparity of conscientiousness on simple difference score of
conscientiousness were not significant.
Faking emotional stability. The interaction between intention to
fake and job capability regressed on regression adjusted difference
score of emotional stability revealed significant effect, b = -.077, p
< .05. Figure 12 below showed the interaction effect. The results
suggested that people with low job capability faked in the wrong
direction in higher degree compared with people with average and
high job capability.
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However, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on regression adjusted difference score of
emotional stability revealed non-significant effect, b = -.031 p
= .21. The direct effect and indirect effect of disparity of emotional
stability on faking score of emotional stability were not significant.
The interaction between intention to fake and job capability
regressed on simple difference score of emotional stability
revealed significant effect, b = -.079, p < .05. Figure 13 below
showed the interaction effect. The results suggested that among
those who faked in the correct direction, people with low job
capability faked more on emotional stability than people with
average and high job capability.
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However, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on simple difference score of emotional
stability revealed non-significant effect, b = -.024 p = .36. The
direct effect of disparity of emotional stability on simple difference
score of emotional stability was conditionally moderated by job
capability and moral disengagement such that when moral
disengagement is at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect size was only significant at low level of
job capability (-1 SD below the mean; b = .14, SE = .064, p < .05,
95% CI[.012, .27]). When moral disengagement is at mean level
(SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct effect size was only
significant at low level of job capability (-1 SD below the mean; b
= .11, SE = .055, p < .05, 95% CI [.0009, .22]). When moral
disengagement is at high level (+ SD above the mean), the
conditional direct effects were not significant. Additionally, none
of the conditional indirect effects were significant.
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Faking intellect. The interaction between intention to fake and job
capability regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
intellect revealed significant effect, b = -.067, p < .05. Figure 14
below showed the interaction effect.

In addition, the interaction between intention to fake and moral
disengagement on regression adjusted difference score of intellect
revealed a significant effect, b = -.071, p < .05. Figure 15 below
showed the interaction effect. The pattern showed that people with
low moral disengagement score observed larger amount of faking
of intellect than people with average and high score of moral
disengagement.
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The direct effect of disparity of intellect on faking score of
intellect was conditionally moderated by job capability and moral
disengagement such that when moral disengagement is at low
level(-1 SD below the mean), the conditional direct effect size
decreases as job capability increases from low level (-1 SD below
the mean; b = .26, SE = .058, p < .05, 95% CI[.14, .37]) to mean
level (SD equal to the mean; b = .18, SE = .041, p < .05, 95%
CI[.10, .26]) and to high level (+1 SD below the mean; b = .12, SE
= .044, p < .05, 95% CI[.033, .21]). This suggested that conditional
direct effect size decreases as job capability increases at low level
of moral disengagement. When moral disengagement is at mean
level (SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct effect size
decreases when job capability increases from low level((-1 SD
below the mean; b = .17, SE = .050, p < .05, 95% CI [.069, .27]) to
mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .094, SE = .036, p < .05,
95% CI [.022, .16]). When moral disengagement is at high level
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(+1 SD above the mean), the conditional direct effect was not
significant. Additionally, none of the conditional indirect effects
were significant.
The interaction between intention to fake and job capability
regressed on simple difference score of intellect revealed a
significant effect, b = -.062, p < .05. Figure 16 below showed the
interaction effect.

In addition, the interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement on simple difference score of intellect
revealed a significant effect, b = -.074, p < .05. Figure 17 below
showed the interaction effect.
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The direct effect of disparity of intellect on faking score of intellect
was conditionally moderated by job capability and moral
disengagement such that when moral disengagement is at low
level(-1 SD below the mean), the conditional direct effect size
decreases as job capability increases from low level (-1 SD below
the mean; b = .24, SE = .062, p < .05, 95% CI[.12, .36]) to mean
level (SD equal to the mean; b = .17, SE = .044, p < .05, 95%
CI[.085, .26]) and to high level (+1 SD below the mean; b = .12,
SE = .047, p < .05, 95% CI[.022, .21]). This suggested that
conditional direct effect size decreases as job capability increases
at low level of moral disengagement. When moral disengagement
is at mean level (SD equal to the mean), the conditional direct
effect size decreases when job capability increases from low
level((-1 SD below the mean; b = .15, SE = .054, p < .05, 95% CI
[.041, .25]) to mean level (SD equal to the mean; b = .079, SE
= .036, p < .05, 95% CI [.0027, .15]). When moral disengagement
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is at high level (+1 SD above the mean), the conditional direct
effect was not significant. Additionally, none of the conditional
indirect effects were significant.

4.4.

Moderated Moderated Mediation
The PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018) model 21 was used to

explore Hypothesis 5 which proposed that job desirability (first
stage moderator), moral disengagement and job capability (second
stage moderators) together would moderate the relationship
between disparity and faking through intention to fake in the
overall model. The first series of moderated moderated mediation
analysis examined job desirability as the first stage moderator and
moral disengagement as the second stage moderator. Among the
10 moderated moderated mediation model tested (faking five
personality traits measured by regression adjusted difference score
and faking five personality traits measured by simple difference
score), none of the models were supported. The second series of
moderated moderated mediation analysis examined job desirability
as the first stage moderator and job capability as the second stage
moderator. Among the ten models tested, only one moderated
moderated mediation model was conditionally supported: job
desirability (first stage moderator) and job capability (second stage
moderator) together moderated the relationship between disparity
of extraversion and faking extraversion through intention to fake
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(Mediator). To illustrate, the conditional indirect effect was
significant such that when job capability was at low level (-1 SD
below the mean), job desirability moderated the relationship
between disparity of extraversion and regression adjusted
difference score of extraversions through intention to fake.
Therefore, hypothesis 5 was not fully supported.

4.4.1. Job desirability and moral disengagement
Faking extraversion. The interaction between disparity of
extraversion and job desirability regressed on intention to fake
revealed significant effect, b = -.22, p < .05. The direct effect of
disparity of extraversion on intention to fake was conditionally
moderated by job desirability such that only when job desirability
was at high level (+1 SD above the mean), the conditional direct
effect was significant, b = -.33, SE = .15, p < .05, 95%
CI[-.62, .-.036]). The interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement regressed on regression adjusted difference
score of extraversions was not significant, b = -.014, p = .65. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examining simple difference score of extraversions, the interaction
between disparity of extraversion and job desirability regressed on
intention to fake revealed significant effect, b = -.22, p < .05. The
direct effect of disparity of extraversion on intention to fake was
conditionally moderated by job desirability such that only when
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job desirability was at high level(+1 SD above the mean), the
conditional direct effect was significant, b = -.33, SE = .15, p < .05,
95% CI[-.62, .-.036]). The interaction between intention to fake
and moral disengagement regressed on simple difference score of
extraversions was not significant, b = -.018, p = .57. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant.
Faking agreeableness. The interaction between disparity of
agreeableness and job desirability regressed on intention to fake
revealed non-significant effect, b = -.15, p = .25. The direct effect
of disparity of agreeableness on intention to fake was not
significant. The interaction between intention to fake and moral
disengagement regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
agreeableness was significant, b = -.048, p < .05. The conditional
direct and indirect effects were not significant. When examining
simple difference score of agreeableness, the interaction between
disparity of agreeableness and job desirability regressed on
intention to fake revealed non-significant effect, b = -.15, p = .25.
The direct effect of disparity of agreeableness on intention to fake
was not significant. The interaction between intention to fake and
moral disengagement regressed on simple difference score of
agreeableness was significant, b = -.050, p < .05. The conditional
direct and indirect effects were not significant.
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Faking conscientiousness. The interaction between disparity of
conscientiousness and job desirability regressed on intention to
fake revealed significant effect, b = -.39, p < .05. The direct effect
of disparity of conscientiousness on intention to fake was not
significant. The interaction between intention to fake and moral
disengagement regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
conscientiousness was not significant, b = -.038, p = .069. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examining simple difference score of conscientiousness, the
interaction between disparity of conscientiousness and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect, b = -.39, p < .05. The direct effect of disparity of
conscientiousness on intention to fake was not significant. The
interaction between intention to fake and moral disengagement
regressed on simple difference score of conscientiousness was not
significant, b = -.038, p = .11. The conditional direct and indirect
effects were not significant.
Faking emotional stability. The interaction between disparity of
emotional stability and job desirability regressed on intention to
fake revealed significant effect, b = -.27, p < .05. The direct effect
of disparity of emotional stability on intention to fake was not
significant. The interaction between intention to fake and moral
disengagement regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
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emotional stability was not significant, b = -.028, p = .26. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examining simple difference score of emotional stability, the
interaction between disparity of emotional stability and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect, b = -.27, p < .05. The direct effect of disparity of emotional
stability on intention to fake was not significant. The interaction
between intention to fake and moral disengagement regressed on
simple difference score of emotional stability was not significant, b
= -.019, p = .45. The conditional direct and indirect effects were
not significant.
Faking intellect. The interaction between disparity of intellect and
job desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed nonsignificant effect, b = -.15, p = .24. The interaction between
intention to fake and moral disengagement regressed on regression
adjusted difference score of conscientiousness was significant, b =
-.070, p < .05. The direct effect of disparity of intellect on
regression adjusted difference score of intellect was conditionally
moderated by moral disengagement such that only when moral
disengagement was at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect was significant, b = .14, SE = .042, p
< .05, 95% CI[.055, .22]). None of the conditional indirect effects
were significant. When examining simple difference score of
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intellect, the interaction between disparity of intellect and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed non-significant
effect, b = -.15, p = .24. The interaction between intention to fake
and moral disengagement regressed on simple difference score of
conscientiousness was significant, b = -.070, p < .05. The direct
effect of disparity of intellect on simple difference score of
intellect was conditionally moderated by moral disengagement
such that only when moral disengagement was at low level(-1 SD
below the mean), the conditional direct effect was significant, b
= .14, SE = .043, p < .05, 95% CI[.053, .22]). None of the
conditional indirect effects were significant.

4.4.2. Job desirability and job capability
Faking extraversion. The interaction between disparity of
extraversion and job desirability regressed on intention to fake
revealed significant effect, b = -.22, p < .05. The direct effect of
disparity of extraversion on intention to fake was conditionally
moderated by job desirability such that only when job desirability
was at high level(+1 SD above the mean), the conditional direct
effect was significant, b = -.33, SE = .15, p < .05, 95%
CI[-.62, .-.036]). The interaction between intention to fake and job
capability regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
extraversions was significant, b = -.15, p < .05. The direct effect of
disparity of extraversion on simple difference score of extraversion
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was conditionally moderated by job capability such that only when
job capability was at low level(-1 SD below the mean), the
conditional direct effect was significant, b = .24, SE = .062, p
< .05, 95% CI[.12, .36]).The conditional indirect effect was
significant such that when job capability was at low level (-1 SD
below the mean), job desirability moderated the relationship
between disparity of extraversion and regression adjusted
difference score of extraversion through intention to fake (b =
-.053, BootSE = .031, BootCI[-.12, -.0012]). Therefore, the
moderated moderated mediation model was conditionally
significant.
When examining simple difference score of, interaction
between disparity of extraversion and job desirability regressed on
intention to fake revealed significant effect, b = -.22, p < .05. The
direct effect of disparity of extraversion on intention to fake was
conditionally moderated by job desirability such that only when
job desirability was at high level(+1 SD above the mean), the
conditional direct effect was significant, b = -.33, SE = .15, p < .05,
95% CI[-.62, .-.036]). The interaction between intention to fake
and job capability regressed on simple difference score of
extraversions was significant, b = -.14, p < .05. The direct effect of
disparity of extraversion on simple difference score of extraversion
was conditionally moderated by job capability such that when job
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capability increases from the low level(-1 SD below the mean; b
= .24, SE = .061, p < .05, 95% CI[.11, .36]) to mean level (SD
equal to the mean; b = .084, SE = .042, p < .05, 95%
CI[.0017, .17]), the conditional direct effect decreases. The
conditional indirect effect was significant such that when job
capability was at low level (-1 SD below the mean), job desirability
moderated the relationship between disparity of extraversion and
simple difference score of extraversion through intention to fake (b
= -.052, BootSE = .030, BootCI[-.12, -.0016]). Therefore, the
moderated moderated mediation model was conditionally
significant.
Faking agreeableness. The interaction between disparity of
agreeableness and job desirability regressed on intention to fake
revealed non-significant effect, b = -.15, p = .25. The direct effect
of disparity of agreeableness on intention to fake was not
significant. The interaction between intention to fake and job
capability regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
agreeableness was not significant, b = -.043, p = .17. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examining simple difference score of agreeableness, the interaction
between disparity of agreeableness and job desirability regressed
on intention to fake revealed non-significant effect, b = -.15, p
= .25. The direct effect of disparity of agreeableness on intention to
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fake was not significant. The interaction between intention to fake
and job capability regressed on simple difference score of
agreeableness was not significant, b = -.051, p = .11. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant.
Faking conscientiousness. The interaction between disparity of
conscientiousness and job desirability regressed on intention to
fake revealed significant effect, b = -.39, p < .05. The direct effect
of disparity of conscientiousness on intention to fake was not
significant. The interaction between intention to fake and job
capability regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
conscientiousness was not significant, b = .022, p = .45. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examine simple difference score of conscientiousness, the
interaction between disparity of conscientiousness and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect, b = -.39, p < .05. The direct effect of disparity of
conscientiousness on intention to fake was not significant. The
interaction between intention to fake and job capability regressed
on simple difference score of conscientiousness was not
significant, b = -.0082, p = .79. The conditional direct and indirect
effects were not significant.
Faking emotional stability. When examining regression adjusted
difference score of emotional stability, the interaction between
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disparity of emotional stability and job desirability regressed on
intention to fake revealed significant effect, b = -.27, p < .05. The
direct effect of disparity of emotional stability on intention to fake
was not significant. The interaction between intention to fake and
job capability regressed on regression adjusted difference score of
emotional stability was not significant, b = -.049, p = .11. The
conditional direct and indirect effects were not significant. When
examining simple difference score of emotional stability, the
interaction between disparity of emotional stability and job
desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed significant
effect, b = -.27, p < .05. The direct effect of disparity of emotional
stability on intention to fake was not significant. The interaction
between intention to fake and job capability regressed on simple
difference score of emotional stability was significant, b = -.068, p
< .05. The conditional direct and indirect effects were not
significant.
Faking intellect. When examining regression adjusted difference
score of intellect, the interaction between disparity of intellect and
job desirability regressed on intention to fake revealed nonsignificant effect, b = -.15, p = .24. The interaction between
intention to fake and job capability regressed on regression
adjusted difference score of intellect was not significant, b = -.026,
p = .41. The conditional direct and indirect effects were non-
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significant. When examining simple difference score of intellect,
the interaction between disparity of intellect and job desirability
regressed on intention to fake revealed non-significant effect, b =
-.15, p = .24. The interaction between intention to fake and job
capability regressed on simple difference score of intellect was not
significant, b = -.031, p = .34. The direct and indirect effects were
not significant.

4.5.

Risk Perception
Hypothesis 6 proposed that risk perception would directly

predict people’s intention to fake. In order to test that, a simple
linear regression was conducted to examine the relationship. The
results suggested that perceived risk significantly predicted
people’s intention to fake (b = -.36, t (162) = -2.97, p < .05, R2
= .052) suggesting that 5.20% of the variance of intention to fake
were accounted for by perceived risks. The negative relationship
suggests that when people perceived higher risks to engage in
applicant faking behaviors, they would have lower intention to
fake.

4.6.

Exploratory Analysis
In the current study, we proposed that people with higher

disparity would have higher intention to fake and therefore leads to
more faking. However, the regression analysis results suggested
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that disparity had no significant relationship with intention to fake
and lower intention to fake leads to more faking. This is not
consistent with the literature. Since moral disengagement and
intention to fake constructs are highly socially desirable, it is
possible that people faked one or both of the scales while taking
the surveys. Current results suggested that disparity alone was not
significantly correlated with intention to fake. However, after
controlling moral disengagement, disparity of extraversion (b
= .26, t(163) = 2.73, p < .05, R2 = .032), disparity of
conscientiousness (b = .33, t(163) = 2.25, p < .05, R2 = .022) and
disparity of emotional stability(b = .40, t(163) = 3.20, p < .05, R2
= .043) positively predicted intention to fake. This suggested that
the moral disengagement construct masked the correlation between
disparity and intention to fake. When moral disengagement was
kept the same, disparity positively correlated with intention to fake
suggesting that larger disparity leads to higher intention to fake.
Additionally, previous results suggested that intention to
fake was negatively related to regression adjusted difference score
of agreeableness (b = -.069, t(163) = -2.08, p < .05, R2 = .026),
conscientiousness (b = -.10, t(163) = -3.36, p < .05, R2 = .065),
and emotional stability (b = -.11, t(163) = -3.25, p < .05, R2
= .061). Also, intention to fake was found to have non-significant
relationships with all the simple difference scores of the five
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personality traits. After controlling for moral disengagement,
intention to fake positively predicted regression adjusted difference
score of extraversions (b = .12, t (162) = 2.66, p < .05, R2 = .036),
and intellect (b = .093, t (162) = 2.49, p < .05, R2 = .033). In
addition, after controlling for moral disengagement, intention to
fake positively predicted simple difference scores of extraversions
(b = .17, t (162) = 3.43, p < .05, R2 = .057) and intellect (b = .11, t
(162) = 2.65, p < .05, R2 = .041). Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that people might have distorted the moral
disengagement scale and the distorted moral disengagement scale
suppressed the correlation between intention to fake and faking.
When moral disengagement was controlled, intention to fake
positively correlated with observed faking, suggesting that higher
intention to fake leads to more faking.
Previous results also showed that moral disengagement
positively related to intention to fake (b = .55, t (163) = 7.94, p
< .05, R2 = .28), suggesting that people who are more morally
disengaged tend to generate higher intention to fake. However,
moral disengagement was negatively related to regression adjusted
difference score of extraversion ( b = -.21, t (164) = -5.10, p < .05,
R2 = .14), agreeableness (b = -.18, t (164) = -5.58, p < .05, R2
= .16), conscientiousness (b = -.22, t (164) = -7.78, p < .05, R2
= .27), emotional stability (b = -.21, t (164) = -6.39, p < .05, R2
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= .20) and intellect (b = -.15, t (164) = -4.41, p < .05, R2 = .11). In
addition, moral disengagement was also negatively related to
simple difference score of extraversion (b = -.25, t (164) = -5.36, p
< .05, R2 = .15), agreeableness b = -.12, t (164) = -3.38, p < .05, R2
= .065), conscientiousness (b = -.12, t (164) = -3.46, p < .05, R2
= .068), and emotional stability (b = -.14, t (164) = -3.66, p < .05,
R2 = .076). This suggested moral disengagement significantly
predicted observed faking, but in the opposite direction as I
expected. The findings suggested that people who are less morally
disengaged tend to engage in more faking behaviors. Frequency
analysis showed that 84.9% of the participants self-reported
themselves as below 5 (somewhat agree) on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) when answering the
moral disengagement items, meaning they self-reported as not
morally disengaged. It is very likely that people faked the moral
disengagement scale so that those who rated themselves as less
morally disengaged were actually more morally disengaged and
therefore engaged in more faking behaviors.
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5. Discussion
Previous studies suggested that job seekers have certain
expectations on the characteristics of ideal applicants and
applicants who have the most similar traits to the ideal applicant
were more likely to be hired for the job (i.e., Vianen & Willemsen,
1992). In addition, applicants’ stereotyped beliefs about ideal
applicants influenced job applicants’ impression management
behaviors (Von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). For instance,
applicants who perceived that the interviewers held traditional
views of women often presented themselves in a more traditional,
“feminine” manner. However, to the authors knowledge, there is
no empirical studies that have directly examined how perceived
disparity between applicants themselves and the ideal applicant
would influence faking behaviors. The primary intent of the
current study was to examine the process underlying faking
behavior as guided by perceived disparity.

5.1.

Discussion of Findings
The current study utilized a within-subjects design where

each participant took the same personality assessment twice (once
in applicant condition and once in honest condition). One potential
problem with within-subjects design is the risk of pre-testing
effects (Hausknecht, Trevor, & Farr, 2002). However, there is
inconsistent results regarding whether or not faking responses
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might be a result of testing effects instead of response distortion
(Hausknecht et al., 2002). Nguyen, Biderman, and McDaniel
(2005) found a larger effect size when respondents received honest
instruction first (d = .34) than those received faking instructions (d
= .15). In addition, Oostrom, Kobis, Ronay, and Cremers (2017)
found larger observed faking when receiving faking instruction
first (d = 1.09) than honest instruction first (d = .82). Therefore,
before interpreting results regarding disparity and observed faking
relationship, t-tests was conducted, and the results showed that
personality scores were not significantly different when comparing
participants who took honest condition first (d=.37) and
participants who took applicant condition first (d=.41) suggesting
that there were no pre-test effects.
Further analysis of the study suggested that disparity had a
significant positive relationship with observed faking measured
using regression adjusted difference scores and simple difference
scores between honest condition and applicant condition.
However, the relationship between disparity and observed faking
was not significantly mediated by the level of intention to fake.
The level of job desirability was found to be a significant first
stage moderator within the mediation model at certain levels only
for observed faking scores of extraversions. Furthermore, moral
disengagement and job capability were found to be significant
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moderators within the mediation model at certain levels for
observed faking scores of extraversions, agreeableness, emotional
stability and intellect. Additionally, the moderated moderated
analysis suggested that only one model was conditionally
supported: when job desirability as the first stage moderator is at
high level (+1 SD above the mean) and job capability as the second
moderator is at low level (-1 SD below the mean) the moderated
mediation model examining the relationship between disparity of
extraversion and faking scores of extraversion through intention to
fake (Mediator) was significant. Also, risk perception negatively
predicted intention to fake, suggesting that people who perceived
faking as riskier have lower intention to fake

5.2.

Theoretical Contributions
The current study offers three main contributions to theory

and research within the domain of applicant faking behaviors. To
elaborate, it proposed a theory of perceived disparity by
demonstrating perceived disparity relationship with observed
faking outcomes. Levashina and Campion (2007) suggested that
job applicants’ often answer interview questions referring to the
image of ideal applicant for the job. In addition, some studies
found that “ideal employee” is the sixth factor emerges from the
Big Five data from the applicant sample (i.e., Schmit & Ryan,
1993). Applicant faking behaviors are goal oriented (Diefendorff
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& Chandler, 2011) and the common goal for nearly all applicants
is to get the job. When they believe they are more than qualified
for the potential job position, there is no disparity, and, therefore,
no intention to fake. However, when they are less qualified than
the ideal applicant, there is negative disparity, and therefore, there
will be intention to fake. According to Perceptual Control Theory
(PCT), applicant faking behaviors varied depending on the level of
disparity (negative feedback) of themselves and the ideal applicant
profile. The current study is the first empirical study to examine
the impact of perceived disparity on observed faking behaviors.
Results showed that perceived disparity provide an explanation of
a significant portion of observed faking measured using regression
adjusted difference score and simple difference score, thus
providing significant support for the proposed disparity theory. To
elaborate, disparity of extraversion explained 3.90% of the
variance in regression adjusted difference score of extraversions
and 31.20% of the variance in simple difference score of
extraversions. Disparity of agreeableness explained 11.80% of the
variance in regression adjusted difference score of agreeableness
and 22.80% of the variance in simple difference score of
agreeableness. Disparity of conscientiousness explained 15% of
the variance in regression adjusted difference score of
conscientiousness and 30% of the variance in simple difference
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score. In addition, disparity of emotional stability explained 14%
of the variance in regression adjusted difference score of emotional
stability and 35% of the variance in simple difference score of
emotional stability. Disparity of intellect explained 8.60% of the
variance of regression adjusted difference score of intellect and
24% of the variance of simple difference score of intellect.
The second contribution is the further elaboration of the
relational mechanism that mediates the relationship between
disparity and observed faking outcomes through intention to fake.
Though disparity were not indirectly related to any observed
faking outcomes through intention to fake when no moderators
were included, the indirect effects of disparity on observed faking
were partially significant when examining the relationship by
adding first and second stage moderators through intention to fake.
This leads to the third contribution, which attempted to further
explain the mediation models through job desirability as the first
stage moderator and moral disengagement and job capability as the
second stage moderators. While the overall hypothesis was not
fully supported, the results did reveal some significant direct and
indirect effects. Job desirability was found to be a positive
predictor and job capability was found to be a negative predictor
within the mediation models for extraversion. In addition, the
moderated mediation model was conditionally significant when job

129

desirability was at high level and job capability was at low level.
Thus, the results reveal potential usefulness of the disparity theory
in predicting applicant faking behaviors at certain conditions.

5.3.

Practical Contributions
The findings of the present study imply that organizations

need to be aware that applicants might generate an ideal applicant
profile and distort their responses according to their perceptions of
the ideal applicant when applying for a job. The positive
relationship between disparity and observed faking behaviors
suggested that applicants who perceived themselves as less
qualified than the ideal applicant are likely to engage in more
applicant faking behaviors. According to Levashina and Campion
(2003), job applicants distort their responses in job desirable
manner that is consistent with their perceptions of ideal applicant
profile. They also outlined several practical suggestions for
employers concerning faking due to perception of ideal applicant.
Though these strategies were designed for job interviews instead of
survey assessments format of job selections, some of these
strategies may provide practical insights for preventing faking of
personality measured by survey methods as well. The first
recommendation is to use better types of questions including: 1)
subtle questions; 2) non-job relevant questions; 3) historical
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questions; 4) verifiable questions that include factual, external
behaviors; and 5) objective items including job knowledge
questions. The second recommendation is to use longer and larger
number of questions. This will reduce faking since it increases the
difficulty to fake consistently and successfully. Third, use detailed
anchored rating scales that provide behavioral examples or
descriptions of answers to help applicants make more realistic
judgements of their own standing. This will reduce faking since it
forces applicants to focus on the job-related aspects and therefore
distracts them from thinking of the ideal applicant and faking. All
of these strategies imply that testing items that distract applicants
from thinking of ideal applicant are critical in preventing applicant
faking behaviors and generate more realistic responses.
The challenge for organizations is to balance the delivery
of accurate and detailed recruitment messages regarding who they
want to hire with the goal of preventing faking. When ideal
applicant profile is too transparent to candidates, it might
encourage higher level of faking. However, when the ideal
applicant profile is not clear enough, organizations might have
difficulty to attract and retain top talents. Future study could
examine the level of details of recruitment message in affecting
applicant faking behaviors. Given that there is not enough
empirical support to make specific recommendations on how much
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details to reveal when displaying recruitment message, one way we
can alleviate the negative impact of ideal applicant profile on
applicant faking behaviors is to measure perceived disparity and
use it as a control variable since disparity positively leads to
observed faking scores. By asking applicants to report how they
perceive ideal applicant, organizations could gain knowledge on
candidates’ realistic perceptions of ideal applicant profile and
make evaluations on whether there’s a match between applicants’
and organizations’ ideal applicant profile. This could help
organizations develop more accurate job recruitment message in
the future and provide insights on the directions and contents of
recruitment message that need to be adapted to prevent faking.
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6. Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of this study is the use of job application
simulation on Mechanical Turk instead of real-world job
application process, which could potentially be a concern in regard
to motivation or intention to fake. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006)
suggested that applicant faking behaviors are manifested through
intention to fake, and intention to fake is a direct antecedent of
faking behaviors (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). However, lab research is
often criticized as not producing the same motivation to fake as in
real life settings (i.e., Ellingson, Smith, & Sackett, 2001). In the
current study, we used experimental manipulations to ask
participants to imagine they are applying for the job to mimic the
motivation to fake. The current study tried many ways to simulate
the “real world” motivation such as the creation of a realistic job
description; however, it might still be difficult to achieve the same
level of motivation as “real world” job application. More creative
ways could be conducted to engender realism within a lab context.
For example, Ellingson, Heggestad, and Coyne (2012) used
experimental manipulations by providing instructions that an
organization was seeking to construct with a personality test in
order to hire recent graduate students. As part of test development
process, students were asked to take the personality test and
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organizations will review their responses upon request and make
hiring decisions based on that. In addition, future studies could
partner with organizations and collect real job applicants’ data and
replicate the study.
McFarland and Ryan (2000) suggested that betweensubjects designs ignore the variability of applicants scores and
therefore limited the accuracy of faking estimations. Therefore, the
current study utilized within-subjects design to examine applicants
faking behaviors, which are suggested as more appropriate than
between-subjects design (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Despite the
fact that within-subjects designs have many advantages over
between-subjects designs, this research is somewhat limited by the
fact that observed faking were not captured by a direct measure of
actual faking behaviors (e.g., bogus item; Dwight & Donovan,
2003). Instead, observed faking was measured using statistical
inference including regression adjusted difference score and simple
difference score. Although these statistical methods of measuring
observed faking showed utility and effectiveness by previous
studies (Landers, Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011; Hogan, Barrett, &
Hogan, 2007; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Christiansen et al., 2005),
they still could not directly measure how much people fake. The
major advantage of these direct approaches such as bogus items
and overclaiming scales is that they directly detect faking via
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endorsement of non-existent items (Anderson, Warner, & Spencer;
1984). Furthermore, Paulhus and Dubois (2014) suggested that
these direct approaches successfully discriminate the accuracy
(honest responses) and bias (distorted responses) of test takers.
Future studies could investigate whether the impact of disparity
remains significant when faking is detected using direct
approaches including bogus item or overclaiming scales.
The third potential limitation of this study is the use of moral
disengagement scale as the focal measure in studying the role of
moral constructs. Although moral disengagement was found as
significantly related to unethical behaviors (Moore et al., 2012),
using it as the sole measure limited our ability to verify whether
the self-reported moral disengagement scores are true scores, or
faked scores distorted due to social desirability. Randall and
Fernandes (1991) found that perceived desirability have significant
influence on self-reported ethical conduct scores. Additionally,
Bernardi, Delorey, LaCross and Waite (2003) suggested that social
desirability bias should be controlled when examining ethics in
research studies that involves self-reported data. Unfortunately, the
current study did not measure social desirability, so we were
unable to examine the impact of social desirability on the selfreported score of moral disengagement. Future studies should
incorporate the scale of social desirability in the study design and
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partial out the impact of social desirability bias when examining
the relationship between ethic related constructs and faking related
constructs.
Lastly, the job description as “entry-level customer service
manager” position provided to simulate the job application process
may have decreased the generalizability of the results. Kanfer
(1990) suggested that people’s behavior is episodic, and they
engage in different behaviors in specific situations. Depending on
the content of the job descriptions, applicants are likely to generate
different ideal applicant profiles and therefore engage in different
applicant faking behaviors. Future studies could examine other job
positions and investigate if job positions have an impact on
perceived disparity between candidates themselves and the ideal
applicant.
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